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ACCORD.
1. Agreement to accept smaller sum in satisfaction of debt, carried into
execution by receipt of money and execution of release, &c., is valid and irrevo-
cable. Gordon v. Moore, 618.
2. Agreement to accept from third person, in behalf of debtor, money or
security for smaller sum in satisfaction of whole is binding. Id.
3. Agreement between judgmept debtor and creditor that, in consideration
of debtor paying down part of debt and costs, and on condition of his paying
residue by instalments, creditor will not proceed on judgment, is nudumpactum,
and does not prevent creditor, after payment of whole debt and costs, from
enforcing payment of interest. Foakes v. Beer, 21.
ACCOUNT..
1. An account rendered is only prima facie evidence against party making
it. Clark v. Marbourg, 478.
2. In absence of fraud, mistake or ignorance of his rights, owner of building
cannot open account stated between himself and builder, and defend note given
in settlement on ground of damages, from delay in prosecution of the work, for
which at settlement he had made no claim. .Piclkel v. Association, 208.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT.
Statute requiring, in caes of deed by husband and wife of wife's realty, that
deed be "shown and explained" to wife by officer taking the acknowledgment,
omission from officer's certificate that this has been done, is fatal. Paine v.
Baker, 796.
ACTION. See CHECK. CO3EoN CARRIER, 2. CONFLICT OF LAws, 1. CoR-
rORATION, 28. FORMER iRECOVERY, 1. FRAUD, 3. HUSBAND AND WIFE,
4, 5, 19. JUDGMENT, I. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 4. OFFICER.
1. Trespass on the freehold will not lie in Vermont for trespass on land in
Massachusetts. Xile v. Howe, 680.
2. Homicide of person in one state on line of railroad purchased, owned and
worked by railroad company in another, is actionable in latter state. Central
Railroad Co. v. Swint, 138.
3. In such a case, administrator in first state for use of widow and children,
coudd bring suit in latter state by complying with statutory requirements thereof,
hut not otherwise. And if administrator be appointed in latter state, lie may
bring the suit for like uses. -d. See infra, 7.
4. A. allowed water to collect in his cellar so that it found its way into B.'s
cellar which adjoined, but was somewhat deeper. Held, that A. was liable.
Snow v. Whitehead, 230, and note.
5. Action on bond given on the issue of temporary injunction in suit brought
for perpetual injunction is premature until final judgment in injunction suit;
voluntary dismissal of same by plaintiff is such final judgment. Brown v.
Galena Co., 71.
6. If A. borrows money for B., securing same by transfer of stock furnished
by B., to whom the money borrowed is paid by A., action cannot be main-
tained iy A. against B., before A. has repaid the money, or sustained some
loss. Reeve v. Dennett, 269.
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ACTION.
7. Administrator appointed in one state cannot maintain action in another,
where law of state of appointment prohibits him from instituting, maintaining
or prosecuting action in his own state for damages from death of intestate
through another's negligence. Limekiller v. Railroad Co., 269.
8. Lies for conspiring to prevent collection of tax levied under mandamus to
pay judgments of plaintiff and others, and, by threats and hostile demionstra-
tions, preventing any bidding at advertised sale of horses, &c., levied upon by
collector, and intimidating tax payers so that they did not pay the tax. Find-
lay v. McAllister, 268.
9. Does not lie by A. against B. for conspiracy between B. and C., in
obtaining judgment against A. in court of another state having jurisdiction of
subject-matter and parties, in which A. appeared and answered, but was
defaulted, which judgment remains in force, and to satisfy which A.'s property
in that state was sold. Ergstrom v. Sherburn, 209.
10. One with whom contract for carriage of goods is .made, and who is
described therein as consignor, consignee and sole owner, may maintain action
to recover overcharge exacted by carrier as condition of delivery, although he
was not in fact owner and did not personally furnish and pay overchage.
Waterman v. Ry. Co., 139.
11. Privity of contract, express or implied, is necessary to maintenance of
action for money had and received. Nolan v. Manton, 71.
12. Widow received from savings' bank money deposited by her husband in
his name. Letters of administration on husband's estate were afterwards
granted to another. In suit against her by administrator for money had and
received, held, that if she received the money to pay it to administrator when
appointed, or to hold for benefit of husband's estate, the suit might be main-
tained ; but otherwise, if she received the money as her own, as there would
then be no privity of contract. Id.
13. Where there is a contract for delivery of certain articles in different
quantities and at specified intervals, a notice not to send any more, given
before completion, entitles seller to consider contract at an end. Textor v.
Hutchins, 208.
14. Quare, Whether it entitles injured party to immediate action for
damages in respect to all future deliveries. Id.
15. Shortly after such notice but before time for completion of contract, a
composition having been made with certain creditors, including party injured,
and he then claiming no damages for breach of the contract, held, that he could
not afterwards maintain action therefor. Id.
16. Where railroad company agreed with city to pay given sum on cost of
viaduct proposed to be constructed in street, there being no illegal motive in
tendering such aid, held, that company was not jointly liable with city in tort
for private injury to adjoining prolerty caused by viaduct. Culbertson Co. v.
City, 412.
17. City alone has authority to construct viaduct in street, and when one is
so constructed by city, even when done under joint superintendence of city
official and chief engineer of railroad company, which paid part of the price,
held, that viaduct was still public property belonging to city alone. Id.
ACTS OF CONGRESS.
1850, September 9. See CONSTITUTIONAL LA w, 26.
1856, June 15. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 8.
1874, Revised Statutes.
Sect. 563. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 32.
Sect. 639. See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 9.
Sect. 649. See PRACTICE, 2.
Sect. 721. See UNITED STATES COURTS, 2.
Sect. 3564. See UNITED STATES, 1.
Sect. 4450. See ADMIRALTY, 3.
Sect. 4745. See PENSION, 3.
Sect. 4747. See PENSION, I.
Sect. 5219. See NATIONvAL BANeK.
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ACTS OF CONGRESS.
1874, Sect. 5485. See PiNssON, 2.
S,-c[. 5508. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 16.
1875, Mfarch 3. Sc MUNICI'A.L (ORPORATION, 14.
1875, March 3. See Rr.EiOVAL OF CAUSES, 1, 3, 5, 7, 9.
1882, August 3. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 14.
ADMINISTRATOR. See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
ADMIRALTY. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 32. SET-OFF, I.
1. Words in charter patty, " now sailed, or about to sail, from Benizof,
with cargo for Plhiladclphia," require vessel to be already loaded. The hick-
hant, 209.
2. Where certain claims for damages were rejected by District Court because
not included in original libel, held that Circuit Court, on appeal, could, in its
di-cretion, permit libellants to file supplemental and amended libel setting up
such claimi. 2he Charles Morgan, 539.
3. Findings of* board of local inspectors and documents connected therewith,
in proceeding under Rev. Stat., sect. 4450, for investigation of tfats connected
with collision, so fhr as they had a bearing on conduct of licensed officers on
board the boats, are inadmissible in collision suit in admiralty when otfbred by
defendants, as tending to allbet evidence offered by libellants to show that their
boat was in her proper position and had proper Watches and ligihts set at the
time of collision. Id.
AGENT. See ATTACHMENT, 2. BANK, 2-4. CORPORATIoN, 26. EVIDENCE,
11. INSURANCE, 24. MORTGAGE, 22. PARTNESlitr, 6, 7.
1. Consul signing note as consul is individually liable thereupon. De Bian v.
Gola, 777, and note.
2. Consular seal does not make the note a single bill. 1d.
3. General agent of absent principal, having sole authority to manage his
business, will necessarily have authority to bring suits to collect debts, and
insurance in case of loss by fire. Gernum Co. v. Grunert, 479.
4. Who receives money for his principal upon contract not criminal or im-
moral in its character, but contrary to public policy only, will be estopped from
setting up supposed illegality of such contract in defence to action by principal.
Talor v. Pells, 742.
5. Where association of several railroad companies is formed for transaction
of business of common carrier, which is conducted by general managers of ealh,
as in case of partnership, so long as one of companies acts within general scope
of its powers, association will be bound, though particular company hIas exceeded
its authority, as tested by articles of association. E. and P. Despatch v. Cecil,
539.
6. Contract of railway company or association of such companies, made by
its usual agents, with shipper, to ship and carry large quantity of grain at five
cents per hundred less than customary rates, but that same should be billed and
freight paid at current rates, difference to be forthwith paid back to shipper, is
valid. Id.
7. In suit against such association on contract made by local agent of one of
companies, want of power in local agent to make cite contract cannot be shown
by the articles of association. Id.
8. To prove ratification of special contract made by station agent ofailway
company in Illinois, which company was member of such association, it appear-
ing that general manager of same company approved such contract, plaintiff
ofllred in evidence three telegrams between said general manager anl gex.eral
manager of association, sbowing that though first had exceeded his orders, latter
would protect him. Held, that telegrams were competent. Id.
9. Where general manager of such association had notice of special contract
at reduced rate made by agent of one of associated companies, and afterwards
furnishes cars and transports the grain, this is evidence from which ratification
of special contract may be inferred. Id.
AMENDMENT. See ADMIRALTY, 2. FXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORs, 5.
MlECHANzCS' LIEN, 2.
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AMENDMENT.
Ad damnum in declaration may be increased after verdict. Tomlinson v.
Earnshaw, 618.
ANIMALS. See MORTGAGE, 8. TORT, 1-4. TEovER, 4-6.
APPEALS. See ERRORS AND APPEALS.
APPORTIONMENT.
1. Interest due on notes, when it is to be appropriated to income, may be
apportioned. Veazie v. Forsaith, 72.
2. Part of trust estate consisted of notes due from an insolvent estate, which
paid only part of amount (ue thereon. Reld, that the loss was to be borne
pro rata by principal and interest, and .amount received as interest for
period since date of the trust deed credited to income for years in which it was
earned. Id.
ARBITRATION.
1. Even if language of submission be broad enough to cover claim, which it
clearly appears was not before arbitrators, award will not bar it. Lee v.
Dolan, 413.
2. Upon disagreement of the two arbitrators to whom controversy was sub-
mitted, and selection by them of third arbitrator under agreement of reference,
an award made by two of the arbitrators, without giving party against whom it
is rendered an opportunity of being heard, is void. Alexander v. Cunningham,
413.
ARREST. See MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, 3-6.
ASSAULT. See CRIMINAL LA-i, II. DAMAGES, 1, 2, 5.
ASSIGNMENT. See ATTACHMENT, 3, 4. ATTORNEY, 1. BILLS AND NOTES,
1, 10. CONFLICT OF LAWS, 2. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 1. EXECUTION,
4. INSURANCE, 1, 11, 12, 19, 21. LIs PENDENS. REMOVAL OF CAUSES,
4. TORT, 5, 6.
1. Assignee of cause of action against railroad company arising under 43d
sect. Missouri Railroad Law, for double damages for killing of live stock, cannot
sue. Snyder v. Wabash, 4c., Co., 209.
2. Future wages to be earned under present contract, indefinite as to time
and amount, may be assigned. Wade v. Bessey, 139.
3. Mortgages invalid against creditors of mortgagor are invalid against his
assignee for their benefit. Blandy v. Hall, 256, and note.
4. Lien of such mortgage is not preserved by clause in assignment excepting
from its operation all existing liens, and providing that such liens shall not be
affected thereby. Id.
5. Where statute requires entry, on chattel mortgage, of certain statement,
defect in such statement cannot be cured by conditions contained in mortgage
but not referred to in statement. Id.
6. Voluntary assignment for benefit of creditors of personal property, wher-
ever situated, passes it to assignee, at time of assignment, and will prevail over
subsequent lienors, provided it is not in conflict with some positive or customary
law of state where property may be located. Askew v. Bank, 399, and note.
See infra, 9.
* Agent appointed by owner to sell coal lands upon commission, employed
another to aid him in effecting sale, promising to give latter, as was claimed,
half commissions. Sale having been effected, held, on review of evidence, there
was no equitable assignment of half of claim for commissions. Wyman v.
Snyder, 479.
8. Burden of proof is upon party who claims equitable assignment of one-
half of demand. Id.
9. Assignment for benefit of creditors executed in another state by debtor
domiciled there, which provides that certain creditors shall be paid in full before
others receive anything, and which is assented to by creditors holding claims
exceeding in amount value of assigned property, if valid by laws of that state,
will beupheld in Massachusetts as against attaching creditor of assignor domiciled
there. Train v. Kendall, "269. See ante, 6
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ASSIGNMENT.
lO. Where party conveyed all his estate to trustee for sale and collection for
benefit of maker, trustee to be paid commission, and afterwards cxecuted and
delivered to another person an assignment of bond and mortgage, and deliv-
ered bond and mortgage to assignee, and there was no proof that trustee ever
had possession of same, held, assignee had beneficial title. Wellington v. Hleer-
muns, 139.
11. Unrecorded mortgage of personalty, which was made and received in good
faith, but under which no possession was taken, there being no collusion between
the parties nor design to give mortgagor fictitious credit, is good against assign-
ment for benefit of creditors, and the creditors can only claim under the
assignment. Wilson v. L'sten, 413.
ASSUMPSIT. See ACTION, 11, 12. BAILMENT, 4. FoRmEit RECOVERY, 3.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 11. OFFICER, 1, 2.
ATTACHMENT. See ASSIGNMENT, 9. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 15. AMORT-
GAGE, 13.
1. "fResidence " in attachment laws not equivalent to domicile. Difference
between the two. Krone v. Cooper, 269.
2. Property purchased by agent in his own name for undisclosed principal,
cannot be seized for debt of agent unless his creditor has been misled by appear-
ances or conduct of parties. Reed v. Mcllroy, 618.
3. After debtor to defendant in attachment had been garnished by creditor
of defendant, he assigned his claim to another creditor, and notice of transfer'
was given to debtor, when a second creditor in attachmentagainst same defend-
ant garnished same debtor, and both suits proceeded to judgment at same
term. Funds in hands of garnishee were not sufficient to satisty the two judg-
ments : Iletil, that tile same should be apportioned between the two judgment
creditors to exclusion of assignee of debt. RIeeve v. Smith, 743.
4. Chose in action is not assignable, at common law or under Illinois statute,
so as to vest legal title in assignee. Such assignee will take same subject to
all defences. Id.
5. GARNISIMENT, 625.
ATTORNEY. See EVIDENCE, 6. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 4, 5. INFANT, 7.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, 8. PARTNERsHIP, 9. TRIAL, 6.
1. Not liable to subsequent assignee of mortgage for loss by reason of error
in certificate of title given to mortgagee. Dundee Alortgaqe Co. v. Hughes, 197,
and note.
2. Under statute authorizing assignment of counsel to indigent suitors, com-
plainant was assigned to assist defendant in suit to recover from insurance com-
pany amount of policy on her husband's life; he thereupon made agreement with
her for contingent fee of half amount recovered upon recovery of principal and
interest; held, that he was entitled to half of both. Hassell v. Van Routen,
414.
3. Where two parties go together to attorney, and make statements to him
in presence of each other, such statements are not confidential communications.
Lynn v. Lyerle, 743.
4. Attorney who places his name under words "From the office of," on back
of writ in favor of resident of another state, is liable, as endorser, for costs
although in so doing, he violated rule of court. Morrill v. Lamson, 540.
5. Requires special authority to release judgment whieh has not been paid
or satisfied. Rounsaville v. iazen, 269.
AWARD. See ARBITRATION.
BAGGAGE. See CoMION CARRIER, 2, 4-6.
BAILM ENT. See BANKRUPTCY. CONTRACT, 5. SALE, 2, 3.
1. Where goods have been shipped to one who has not ordered them, title
does not pass to consignee by delivery to carrier. Rul v. Corner, 743.
2. If factor have claims for advances against his principal, and it is expressly
agreed that goods shall be shipped to factor to pay those advances, law makes
delivery to carrier delivery to factor. Id.
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BAILMENT.
3. If factor receives consignment of goods for sale, while goods are still pro-
perty of consignor, lien of factor for previous advances will at once attach.
Id.
4. But if, while goods are in transitu and at his risk, consignor parts with
title, goods are no longer his, and lien of his factor will not attach, although
the goods actually come into his possession. In such a case where the trans-
feree of the title brought assumpsit instead of trover against the factor, he was
only allowed to recover for the money received from sale of goods. Id.
5. If mortgagor in possession of personal property stores it with third per-
son, who has no actual notice of the mortgage, which is recorded, the mortgagee
who afterwards is informed of the sharing, and expresses no disapproval, is not
liable to such person for storage charges, although the storage is necessary, but
may maintain action against him for its conversion. Storms v. Smith, 209.
BANK. See CHECK. ConrPo.ATIoN, 26. NATIONAL BANK, 1.
1. Savings bank has no general lien upon surplus proceeds of stock, held as
collateral for payment of note. B rown v. New Bedford Inst., 209.
2. S. S. deposited sum of money in bank and received certificate of deposit
to the order of himself, or of E. S. (his wife). S. S. died. After his death
E. S. presented certificate and drew deposit. Held, that certificate did not
authorize payment of money to her after death of S. S., and that notice to
paying-teller of death of S. S. was notice to bank. Bank v. M'qhtson, 540.
3. The bank filed bill in equity to enjoin prosecution of action at law against
it for the money deposited by S. S., brought by his executor; and to have
certificate reformed. Evidence failed to establish case for reformation of cer-
tificate; but it was developed in proof, that part of money drawn by E. S.,
went directly to payment of debts and funeral expenses of S. S. Held, that
court below committed no error in retaining bill, and under prayer for general
relief, allowing bank credit for the money that went directly to pay debts and
funeral charges of S. S., and for which executor had obtained credit in his
administration account. Id. &
4. Pittsburgh bank sent to New York bank, for collection, eleven nuac-
cepted drafts, dated at various times through period of over three months, and
payable four months after date. They were drawn on " Walter M. Conger,
Secretary Newark Tea Tray Co., Newark, N. J.," and were sent to New York
bank as drafts on company. New York bank sent them, for collection, to
Newark bank, and, in its letters of transmission, recognised them as drafts on
company. Newark bank took acceptances from Conger, individually, on his
refusal to accept as secretary ; but no notice of that fact was given to Pitts-
burgh bank until after maturity of first draft. At that time drawers and
endorser had become insolvent, drawers having been in good credit when
Pittsburgh bank discounted drafts. Held, that New York bank was liable to
Pittsburgh bank for such damages as ic had sustained by negligence of Newark
bank. Bank v. Bank, 139.
BANKRUPTCY. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 5.
Plaintiffs, as an accommodation to themselves, gave order to defendant
directing their debtor to pay him what was due them. He collected and used
the money by mingling it with his own; and in a few days afterwards was
adjudged a bankrupt. After his discharge, in action to recover money, court
below found that there was no evidence tending to show fraudulent intent.
Jury found that when order was given, plaintiffs told defendant "to keep and
use the money until they called for it." Held, that defendant's duty was that
of bailee without hire; that his use of the money was a conversion of it; that
debt was "created by fraud," and not discharged. Hammond v. Noble, 619.
BASTARDY. See CimiwZAL LAW, III. DESCENT, 1.
BENEFICIAL SOCIETY. See INSURANCE, 18, 20.
BIBLE. See SCHOOL, 1, 2.
BILL OF LADING. See COMmON CARRIER, 9.
G. Bros., common agents for sale of fertilizers of Z. & Sons and S., L., K.
& Co., shipped through mistake cotton received in payment of fertilizers of Z.
INDEX.
BILL OF LADING.
& Sons, to S., L., K. & Co., and the bills of lading were also delivered to
them; they sohl the cotton and a pplied proceeds to payment of indebtedness of
G. Bros. to them. Subbeqnently, G. Bros. discovering their mistake, sent to
Z. & Sons an order on S., L., K. & Co. for the cotton. Demand having been
made and delivery refused, ield, that plaintiffs could maintain trover for
cotton, notwithstanding Maryland Act of 1876, elh. 262. Seal v. Zell, 796.
BILLS AND NOTES. AGENT, 1, 2. APpORTioNtENT. BANK, 4. CON-
TRACT, 4. DURESS, 2. EVIDENCE, 14, 15. E.ECUTORS AND ADIINIS-
TRATORS, 2, 3. INTEREST. SET-OFF, 3. SUBROGATION, 1.
I. Form.
1. Though draft contains direction to charge sum drawn for to certain
account, it is still a negotiable bill of exchange, not payable out of a particular
fund, and does not constitute an assignment of the fund. 1l7dtney v. Bank, 270.
2. Note containing clause, "1the drawers and endorsers * * * expressly
agree that the payee or his assignees may extend the time of payment thereof
from time to time, indefinitely, as he or they may see fit," is non-negotiable.
Glidden v. iIcnrq, 716, and note.
3. Note in ordinary form, given by corporation, had on it when produced in
court a paper seal. No vote of corporation authorized the seal ; note did not
purport to be under seal ; seal was not corporate seal, and treasurer of corpo-
ration did not admit putting it on note. Hleld, that seal must be disregarded
as "mere excess." M1ackay v. Church, 680.
11. Rights of parties.
4. Material alteration of note avoids same as to maker not consenting even
in hands of bona fide holder. 1lorn v. Bank, 72.
5. Substituting another payee for original payee, with knowledge and con-
sent of but one of two makers, releases the other. Id.
6. Note not avoided as to maker by material alteration made in accordance
with, but some time after, agreement hetween maker and payee, and without
knowledge of maker. Wardlow v. List, 209.
7. Addition of signature of surety to promissory note, without consent of
maker, does not discharge him. Mersoian v. 1 Verges, 72.
8. Mortgage of hnsband and wife of her land, for accommodation of partner-
ship of which husband is member, and as security for note made by husband to
partner, and endorsed by partner for same purpose, and to which note partner,
before negotiating it, adds wife's name as maker, without consent or knowl-
edge of herself or her husband, is not thereby avoided as against one who, in
ignorance of alteration of note, lends money to partnership upon security of note
and mortgage. Id.
III. Endorsemaent.
9. Where holder and owner of two notes endorsed in blank, one over-due
and other not, gave them to agent to receive payment only, and agent sold them
to innocent per.on without notice, held, that title only passed to note not due.
Towner v. McClelland, 140.
10. That assignee takes note secured by mortgage by assignment before ma-
turity, free from all defences at law, does not protect mortgage against equi-
table defences. Id.
BOND. See EQUITY, 13. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT, 1. OFFICER, 3. RE3tO-
VAL OF CAUSES, 6.
BRIDGES. See HIGHWAYS, STREETS, BRIDGES.
BROKER.
If purchaser, who was spoken to by brokers, had abandoned all idea of the
trade, and they had no influence in bringing it about, they would not be enti-
tled to commissions, although purchaser may subsequently have bought from
owner. Doonan v. lees, 341.
BURDEN OF PROOF. See ASSIGN3EENT, 8. CotMON CARRIER, 7. HUs-
BAND AND WIFE, )7, 23, 24. NEGLIGENCE, 14.
BURGLARY. See CRtIMINAL LAW, IV.
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OASES AFFIRMED, COMMENTED ON, OVERRULED, ETC.
Ballard v. Tomlinson, 26 Ch. Div. 194, diflered from. Snow V. lF/7tehcad,
230.
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 6 Mass. 134, criticized. Cowanwnmealth v.
Pierce, 117.
Escanaba v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, commented on. Cardwell v. Bridge
Co., 272.
Hart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 320. Reversed, 604.
Kansas Pacific Railway Co. v. Lydia H. Sutter, 16 Has. 568, referred to and
distinguished; Perry, as Administrator, &c. v. St. Joseph & Western Railway
Co., 29 Kas: 420, referrLed to and commented upon. Limekiller v. Railroad,
269.
Meek v. Penn Co., 38 Ohio St. 632, followed and approved. HTart v.
Dererux, 214.
Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U. S. 350, principles of reiterated and explained.
JMaler v. Harwood, 148.
Nicklin v. Williams, 10 Ex. 259 ; Backhouse v. Bonomi, E., B. & E. 622,
9 H. L. Cas. 503 ;Whitehouse v. Fellowes, 10 C. B. (N. S.), 765, discussed;
Lamb D. Walker, 3 Q. B. Div. 289, overruled. Mitchell v. Darley Main
Colliery CO., 432.
Pinnel's Case, 5 Rep. 117 a, and Cumber v. Wayne, I Str. 426, followed.
Foakes v. Beer, 21.
Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 35 Ohio St. 1, distinguished. Commissioners
v. Railroad, 802.
Spangler v. Cleveland, 35 Ohio St. 469, approved and followed. Watterson
v. Bradley, 797.
The North Carolina, 15 Pet. 40, distinguished. The Charles iMforgan, 539.
Thompson v. Herman, 4 Wis., distinguished. Mathews v. Case, 146.
Tiorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 114, disapproved. N. Y., L. E. 4" W. Co. v.
Steinbrenner, 684.
Transfer Co. v. Kelley, 36 Ohio St. 86, followed ; Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C.
B. 115, disapproved. St. Clair Street Railway Co. v. Eadie, 706.
Whitcomb v. Whiting, approved and explained; Channell v. Ditchburn, 5
M. & W. 494, and Goddard v. Ingram, Q. B. 839, disapproved. Parker v.
Butterworth, 77.
CERTIORARI. See CORPOnATION, 13.
CHAMPERTY. See TORT, 5.
CHARITY. See WILL, 7, 8.
1. House of Refuge, being a charitable corporation, is not liable for damages
for assault committed by its officer on inmate. Perry v. House of Refuge, 541
2. Where testator devised all his real and personal estate to one as trustee,
to be sold and converted into money when so requested by incorporated religious
society, and applied in establishing an orphan asylum, to be under direction
and control of such society, held, that devise in favor of charity was devise of
money and not of land, and was such as courts of Illinois will uphold. Germain
v. Baltes, 747.
CHARTER-PARTY. See ADMtIRALTY, 1.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE. See MORTGAGE, II.
CHECK.
Holder of, cannot sue bank for refusal to pay on presentation, though drawer
have sufficient on deposit to meet it. Creveling v. Bank, 72.
CITIZENSHIP. See REMOVAL OF CAusEs.
CITY. See MUNICIPAL COPtORATIOe.
COLLATERAL SECURITY. See SURETY, 1, 5.
COMMON CARRIER. See ACTION, 10. AGENT, 5-9. CONTRACT, 5. NEG-
LIGENCE, 5. TELEGRAPH, 7. TELEPiONE, 1, 3.
INDEX.
COMMON CARRIER.
1. Limitation of time in excursion tickets sold at reduced rate, valid. Pen-
nington v. Railroad Co., 209.
2. Where passenger who checked baggage on through ticket with coupon
for each road, finds it lost on arrival at his destination, he can hold last road
responsible. f.'ailiay v. McIntosh, 141.
3. If railroad ticket seller deliver to passenger ticket with hole in it, assuring
him that it is good; passenger may sue company for his expulsion by conductor
for refusing to pay additional fare. Jfurdock v. Railroad. 271.
4. Railway company's liability for passenger's ordinary travelling baggage,
does not cover such articles as blankets, books, &c. lcC aflrey v. Railway
Co., 175, and note.
5. When such goods remain at station at which passenger alights, but it does
not appear that company has charged or is entitled to charge fbr storage, com-
pany is not liable as warehouseman. Id.
6. Baggage and liability of carrier therefor, generally. Id., note.
7. Although burden of proof is on plaintiff* to show that injury was occa-
sioned by negligence of carrier, yet he makes out prima facie case by showing
that accident happened through failure of some of means used by carrier in
making transit. B. 4- 0. C'o. v. lalone, 541.
8. If one has purchased ticket and was crossing track by and under direction
of ticket agent, fbr purpose of taking train, he is entitled to all rights and pro-
tection of passenger. Id.
9. Stipulation in bill of lading as to value of goods, carrier having no other
knowledge thereof, and charge fbr transportation being based upon such valua-
tion, estops shipper from claiming more when goods are lost by negligence of
carrier's servants. Graces v. Railroad, 73. See infra, 17.
10. Where excursion ticket is sold by railroad company at reduced rate, and
upon special conditions printed on back of ticket; one of which is that ticket
shall be used "
fo
r a continuous trip" only, and " is not good to stop off,"
passenger is bound to take through train and cannot stop off. Johnson v. P.
IV. 4- B. Go., 541.
11. In absence of proof that gatekeeper had authority to vary contract,
passenger. cannot get rid of its conditions, by showing that he took the wrong
train, relying on wrong direction given by gatekeeper. Id.
12. Plaintiff's intestate, who in pursuance of contract for carriage of horses,
and in accordance with custom in such cases, was riding in same car with
horses in order to care for them, was killed in collision caused by defendant's
gross negligence. ield, that lio would not be deemed to have been guilty of
contributory negligence. Lawson v. Railway Co., 744.
13. Where it is customary for some person to ride in same car with horses,
to care for them, it would seem to be within general authority of conductor of
train to grant permission so to ride. Id.
14. Passenger on railway is responsible for fare of child under his charge,
and upon refusal to pay same may, together with chihl, be ejected from train,
although he had paid his own fare. Railroad v. floclick, 342.
15. If conductor finds child sitting beside female passenger, and knows father
of child is in car, or could know upon proper inquiry, he has no right to hold
female responsible for child's fare. id.
16. Passenger wrongfully ejected from train is entitled to such d.mages as
jury judge to be proper compensation for unlawful invasion of his rights, and
for injury to his person and lelings. He is not entitled to punitive damages,
which require fraud or evil intent or oppression, if ejection was in discharge of
supposed duty or without any bad intention. hi. See infra. 25.
17. Where contract of carriage signed by shipper is fairly made with rail-
road company, agreeing on valuation of property carried, with rate of freight
based on this valuation, contract will be upheld even in case of loss or damage
by negligence of carrier. Hart v. Railroad Co., 140. See ante, 9.
18. Passenger who, thrbugh negligence of one conductor, is not furnished
with stop-over ticket, and who, on attempting to resume journey, is required by
second conductor to pay additional fare or leave the train, may elect to leave
train, and may recover not only additional fare subsequently paid, but all his
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damages which are direct and natural consequence of fault of first conductor.
Young v. Railway Co., 141.
19. Railway company receiving passenger in car before making up train, will
be liable for injury to such passenger, resulting from negligence in making up
train. Railroad Co. v. Martin, 270.
20. Where passenger in overcrowded coach was informed, by conductor's
announcement, that another car had been added in front, and adding of car
bad been felt when it was pushed back, and it was found in proper position,
though in fact not securely coupled, so that as passenger was stepping on to it,
it moved forward suddenly, causing him to fall, whereby he was injured, Held,
that passenger was not chargeable with want of ordinary care. Id.
21. Where trains of one railway corporation are made up on track of another
and by its employees, and the cars belong to other companies, if use of cars
and tracks and labor is to enable first corporation to perform its duty as common
carrier, passenger injured may sue that corporation. Id. *
22. Stipulation in shipping contract, voluntarily and understandingly entered
into by shipper of livestock, that in consideration of reduced rate any claim for
damages shall be made in writing verified by affidavit of shipper or his agent,
and delivered to general freight agent of carrier, at his office, within five days
from time stock is removed from cars, will bind shipper, and is not void as
contrary to law or public policy. Black v. Railway Co., 270.
23. Where party of mature years and sound mind, able to read and write,
without imposition or artifice, deliberately signs written agreement without in-
forming himself of contents, he will be bound by it. Id.
24. Purchaser of limited ticket over several connecting lines of railroad is
not bound to make his journey continuous over all, but only over each coupon
of ticket ; and over last within time limited, but if last day be Sunday, ticket
cannot be refused afterwards, at least when offered on first train after expiration
of time. Railway v. Dean, 271.
25. Such a ticket expiring on Sunday, and there being no train that day,
passenger offered ticket on train next day. It was refused, and passenger,
under protest and threat of ejection, paid his fare to further station, and there
for want of money, was put off and walked to his destination. Reld, that
extra fare paid, humiliation of being put off train, and incon% enience of reach-
ing destination by walking, were proper elements of damage. rd.
26. In selling coupon ticket over successive lines of road, railway company,
in absence of express agreement, acts only as agent for roads beyond its own.
Penna. Railroad Co. v. Conndl, 619.
27. Where conductor of railway company, under instructions, refuses to
accept ticket issued by another company as agent of former, and demands full
fare, passenger, if his ticket was issued by authority, may pay fare again and
recover of company requiring payment sum paid, as for breach of contract, or
lie may refuse to pay, and leave train when so ordered by conductor, and
recover of company all damages sustained in consequence of expulsion ; but if
he refuses to leave, lie cannot recover for force used by conductor in putting
him off, when no more force is used than necessary, and expulsion is not wanton
or wilful. Id.
COMMON LAW. See PARTICULAR WORDS AND P1nRASES, 1.
CONDITIONAL SALE. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 1, 2.
CONFESSION. See CRtuINAL LAw, 13.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See ACTION, 7. ASSIGNNEXT, 6, 9. CORPORATION,
14, 17, 30. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 3. DESCENT, 2. EXECUTORS AND
ADMINISTRATORS, 2. OUARDIAN AND WARD, 1. LImITATIONS, STATUTE
OF, 1, 2. MORTGAGE, 12. SUNDAY, 2, 3.
1. Action of tort for diverting waters of natural stream in Massachusetts,
and preventing same from coming to plaintiff's mill, in adjoining state, may be
maintained in Massachusetts. That certain percentage of water was returned to
stream may be considered in estimating damages. Manville Co. v. Worcester,
480.
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2. If assignment is made in Massachusetts between parties domiciled there,
of policy of incm'aue issued by company of another state, but delivered in
Massaciusetts, questions of validhty of assignment, and capacity of parties to
contract are to be determined lbv laws of Massachusetts. ,lutual Co. v. Allen,
480.
CONSIDERATION. See CONTRACT, 4. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 9. MORT-
GAGE, 24. NOTIcE, 4. TELEGRAPIC, 2.
CONSPIRACY. See ACTION, 8, 9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAiW, 16.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Cux.m-,IAL LAw, 5, 6. INTERNATIONAL LAW,
2. Sctooa, 2. TAXATION, 3. UNITED STATES, 4, 5. WILL, 3, 4.
I. Powers " Lerlislatnre.
1. One state cannot tax capital stock of corporation of another state, which
runs a ferry between the two. Ierry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 414,
2. Tonnage tax on oyster boats in certain localities, not unconstitutional, as
an attempt to regulate inter-state commerce. Johnson v. Loper, 73.
3. Nor is license fee upon such boats obnoxious to requirement of state con-
stitution, that property shall be assessed under general laws and by uniform
rules, according to its true value. .d.
4. Legislature catl pass healing acts which do not impair obligation of con-
tracts nor interfere with vested rights. Green v. Abraham, 273.
5. What legislature might have dispensed with or made immaterial by pre-
vious statute, it may so act upon by subsequent one. Id.
6. Bringing of stit vests no right to particular decision. Case must be deter-
mined on law as it stands at time of judgment. Id.
7. Power bfcongress to regulate inter-state commerce is exclusive. Its inac-
tion gives states no right to act. 11ardy v. Railway Co., 73.
8. Query: Has not congress so legislated by act of June 15th, 1856, sect.
5258, Rev. Stat., authorizing all railroad companies to transport passengers and
freight from state to state, &c. ? Id.
9. Clause of constitution providing that "all laws of a general nature shall
have a uniform operation throughout the state," is mandatory. Ex parte
Falk, 342.
10. Statute providing punishment for act malum in se wherever committed,
cannot be made local ont ground that inhibited act is greater evil in large city
than in other parts of state. Instance, having burglar's tools in possession. rd.
11. Legislature may impose duty on owners of dams to place therein suitable
fishwayvs, and the owner or user cannot by occupancy or user for any length of
time acquire prescriptive right against the public. Parker v. People, 414.
12. Act allowing municipal corporations to appeal without giving bond, as
in other cases, is not unconstitutional, as being either local law or special legis-
lation. l1ohnes v. Mattoon, 273.
13. Public municipalities, including school districts, and all officers sucing
for or defending rights of state, or acting for or instead of state in respect of
public rights, may be authorized to sue without payment of costs, or conforming
to all requirements imposed upon other suitors. Id.
14. Act of congress of August 3d, 1882, imposing upon vessel owners duty
of fifty cents for every passenger not a citizen of this country, brought f'om for-
cign port into U. S. port, is a-valid exercise of power to regulate comaierce
with foreign nations. Head-money cases, 210.
15. This duty is designed to mitigate the evils of immigration, and it is not
a tax subject to limitations imposed by constitution on general taxing power of
congress. Id.
16. Right to acquire homestead is a right secured by constitution and laves of
United States, within sect. 5508 Rev. Stat., making amenable to penalty those
conspiring against free exercise of such rights. United States v. Waddell, 73:
17. Irrepealable charter of railroad company gave it power to take lands.
by condemnation, and provided for appeal by land-owner, from award of dam-.
ages, to certain court. Held, that general act which took away right to appeal
to that court, and gave appeal to another court on same terms and conditions,
and with same mode of trial, was not unconstitutional.. State. v. Weldon, 74!.
VOL. XXXII.-103
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18. An Indian separated from his tribe and residing among white citizens of
a state, but not naturalized, or taxed, or recognised as a citizen, either by the
United States or the state, is not a citizen of United States, within 1st sect. of
14th art. of amendment to United States constitution. Elk v. Wilkins, 73.
19. Keeping sidewalks in repair is referable to same power as constructing
new improvements, and cannot be required to be done by abutting owner or
occupant, at his own expense, either by exercise of police power, or by fines
and penalties prescribed by ordinance, or by direct legislative action. City v.
Crosby, 414.
20. City has not constitutional power to require owner or occupant of pre-
mises to keep sidewalk and gutters in front thereof free from snow and ice, or
to sprinkle same with .ashes or sand where snow and ice cannot be removed
without injury to pavement, and inflict fine for neglect or failure so to do. City
v. O'Brien, 414.
21. Sidewalk in city is portion of public highway. Id.
22. In absence of constitutional restraints, regulation of liquor traffic s
wholly within legislative control. Legislature may empower municipal corpo-
rations to entirely prohibit it within their limits. But neither counties, cities,
nor towns can impose tax upon privilege not authorized by legislature. Drew
County v. Bennett, 272.
23. State statute authorizing any person to erect and maintain on his own
land a water-mill and mill-dam upon and across any stream not navigable,
paying to owners of lands overflowed damages assessed in judicial proceeding,
does not deprive them of their property without due process of law, in violation
of Fourteenth Amendment of Constitution of United States. Head v. Jeanu-
facturing Co., 272.
24. Whether erection and maintenance of mills under such a statute can be
upheld as a taking of private property for public use under right of eminent
domain, not decided; but, held, that such a statute, considered as regulating
manner in which rights of proprietors of lands adjacent to a stream may be
enjoyed, with due regard to interests of all and to public good, is within con-
stitutional power of legislature. "d.
25. Commercial power of Congress is exclusive only when subjects of it are
-national ; when they are local in nature or operation, or constitute mere aids to
,commerce, the states may provide for their regulation and management until
-Congress intervenes and supersedes their action. Cardwell v. Bridge Co., 271.
26. Clause in Act of Sept. 9th, 1850, admitting California into Union,
-which declares "1 that all the navigable waters within the said state shall be
.common highways and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of said state as to
the,citizens of the United States, without any tax, imposts or duty therefor,"
does not lessen power of the state over such waters ; notwithstanding it, state
.can .authorize construction of bridges over navigable streams to promote public
convenience. Id.
27. By terms of Virginia Funding Act of March 30th, 1871, and the issue
of bonds and coupons in virtue of the same, a contract was made between every
-coupon holder and the state that such coupons should "be receivable at and
after maturity for all taxes," etc., due the state ; the right of coupon-holder,
,under which, was to have his coupons received for taxes when offered : any act
of state which forbids receipt of these coupons for taxes is violation of contract,
:and void as against coupon-holders. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 481.
28. Action brought by taxpayer, who has duly tendered suchcoupons in pay-
ment of his taxes, against tax collector, who, acting under void law of legisla-
•tore, having refused such tender, proceeds by seizure and sale of property of
plaintiff, to enforce collection of such taxes, is not an action against the state
within Eleventh Amendment to Constitution of United States. Id.
29. Act entitled "an act to authorize independent school-districts to borrow
money and issue bonds therefor, for the purpose of erecting and completing
school-houses; legalizing bonds heretofore issued, and making school-orders
draw six percent. interest in certain cases," does not violate constitutional pro-
vision that "every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly
connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title." Ackle
School DitrWict .v. Rall, 272.
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30. Under ordinance city of Clevlanl improved Kinsman street by grading,
draining and paving same. Cost of impro% ement was assessed upon lots
bounding and abutting thereon. The culvert afterwards broke down. City,
hy another ordinance, provided for construction of new culvert at another point
on street, in place of old one, cost of same to he assessed on property bounding
and altting on Kinsman street, within termini of original improvement, but
not bounding on culvert. ,hid, that this additional assessment was not author-
ized by law. l'atterson v. Bradley, 797.
31. CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS OF LEGISLATIV.E PROCEEDINGS, 153.
II. Powers qf the .Tudiciary.
32. While state courts can exercise no jurisdiction in cases peculiarly cogni-
sable in admiralty, yet the saving in the United States statute, to suitors in all
cases, of " the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is compe-
tent to g ive it," permits of a proceeding in state court, for injury to dredge, by
attachment, although this remedy did not exist at common law, but has been
conferred by statute. Milter v. Kirstead, 141.
III. Eminent Domain. See ante, 23.
33. General grant of legislative power in stateconstitution does not authorize
legislature, by riglht of eminent domain or of taxation, to take private property
without owner's consent, for any but public object: as by authorizing city to
issue its bonds by way of donation to private manufacturing corporation. Cole
v. La Grange, 272.
CONSUL. See AGENT, 1, 2.
CONTEMIPT. "See MALICIOUS PRosEcuTION, 4.
1. Definition of direct and constructive contempt of court. Tn re W. IV. D.
H., 74.
2. D. executed his recognisance to appear in court at certain time, and sub-
mit to trial on criminal charge pending against him. He did not so appear,
but absented himself from the county where the court was held. Held, that
lie could be punished for contempt by fine or imprisonment. Id.
CONTRACT. See ACTION, 11-13, 15. AGENT, 6-9. Co.srcIol CARRIER, 22,
23. CONFLICT OF LAWS, 2. EQUITY, 7-9. FRAUD, 1, 2. FRAUDS, STAT-
UTE OF, 12. GUARANTY, I. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 22-27. MORTGAGE,
23-25. SUNDAY, 1-3, 6. TELEGIRAri, 2, 3.
1. Statute provided that City Board of p ublic Works might hire employees
subject to approval of their compensation by council when it exceeded $1000
per annum. Held, that mere non-action by council would not defeat agreement
made by board. MAathewson v. Tripp, 415.
2. When anything is left to be settled in respect to offer by mail or telegraph,
acceptance of offer by telegraphing will not complete contract where dispatch
does not reach its destination. Haas v. Myers, 415.
3. In such a case where dispatch did not reach its destination, and second
dispatch was sent and received on same day that sender and third party had
concluded the purchase contemplated to have been made by sender and receiver,
held, that receiver's offer, on his arrival the next day, to pay his share of price,
was too late. d.
4. After note had matured,'but was still held by payee, two sons of maker,
in order to induce payee not to pass note into hands of third person, ad to
give further time for payment, placed their names under that of their father.
-Held, 1st. That there was good consideration to support contract, which was
to pay amount of note on demand. 2d. That contract was not within Statute
of Frauds. Frech v. Yawger, 680.
5. A mower company, owner of certain mowiing machines, consigned and
forwarded them to D., on contract, trder which D. was to pay the freight and
sell them for specified commission, and account to company for them at specified
price. Hdd, 1. That contract did not change title; 2. D. had such special
property in machines, as to enable him to sue carrier for wrongful act to pro-
perty, and recover his own damages and such as accrued to company as general
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owners ; 3. A sale of property after damage had accrued, would not transfer
claim to damages. Railroad Co. v. Mower Co., 74.
6. By written memorandum A. agreed to buy, and the B. company to sell,
1000 tons of old rails, delivery to be before August 1st, and also 200 to 600
tons for delivery between August 1st. and October 1st. Contract was dated
January 31st, 1880, and was signed by vice-president for company, and he had
full authority to make it. On February 17th vice-president wrote to A. inclos-
ing minute of resolution, purporting to have been passed at meeting of directors
of company on February 16th confirming contract, but specifying 2000 pounds,
as ton contemplated. On February 28th A. replied to this letter, saying that
the sale was "an absolute and final unconditional sale," and that number of
pounds per ton was to be 2240. This was number understood between the parties
at time of making contract. No reply was made to last letter, which ended
with "we hope to hear from you at your early convenience," until June 14th,
when company wrote tendering 1000 tons of 2240 lbs. By that time price of
old rails had fallen. ldd, that contract was in full force, and that company
was not estopped from setting it up against A. Wheeler v. Railroad Co., 680.
7. VALIDITY OF CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE, 217, 281.
CONVERSION. See CHARITY, 2.
COPYRIGHT.
1. Statute appointing state reporter, authorizing secretary of state to con-
tract for publication of his reports and giving to contractor exclusive right to
publish same, confers no right to copyright, nor any exclusive right to publish,
opinions of court. Banks v. Manchester, 519 and note.
2. Qucere, Whether state, through its reporter, can secure copyright in
opinions of its judges. Id.
3. Copyright of legal works, generally. Id., note.
CORPORATION. See BILLS AND NOTES, 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 17.
EQUITY, 13. MALICIouS PROSECUTION, 12. MARRIED WOMEN AS COR-
FORATORS, p. 366. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. RECEIVER, 2. REMOVAL
OF CAUSES, 2, 3. TAXATION, 2-4.
1. There is no liability on subscription to stock of corporation with fixed
capital, until whole amount is subscribed. Temple v. Lemon, 481.
2. Such subscriber cannot be held individually liable for debt of corporation,
unless lie has estopped himself from alleging that whole of fixed capital stock
was never subscribed. Id.
3. Cannot defend itself, in action for tort done by it, on ground that business
in prosecution of which tort was done was ultra rires. Railway Co. v. Raring,
681.
4. Agent of railroad company ejected, with unnecessary violence, passenger
from cars. Held, the company was liable for injury to passenger. Id.
5. President of, by virtue of his office, cannot encumber its property by
mortgago or judgment confessed for money borrowed. Stokes v. Pottery Co., 74.
6. His being owner of nearly all its capital stock, and its president, treas-
urer and active manager, and being accustomed to borrow money for company's
use, will not give him this power. Powers of president generally. Id.
7. Corporation having become insolvent, its receiver, as representative of
creditors, can object that confessed judgment against corporation, was not so
obtained as to bind it. Id.
8. Cause of forfeiture of franchise can only be taken advantage of or enforced
by direct proceeding for that purpose. Attorney-General v. Railroad Co., 619.
9. Where corporation is absolutely dead in law, court of equity has jurisdic-
tion to enjoin threatened acts by persons assuming to act on behalf of, and in
name of dead corporation. Id.
10. And if valid corporation assumes to exercise licenses or powers by vir-
tue of invalid ordinance of municipal corporation, or in excess of authority
legally conferred upon it, court of equity may restrain it. Id.
11. Is liable to any one who has accepted its stock certificate and acted
thereon to his injury, to extent that loss has actually been incurred. Bank v.
Baltimore, 543.
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12. If charter provides that corporation shall cease to exist if certain thing
is not done in certain time, question whether corporation has ceased to exist
can be judicially determined only in suit to which Commonwealth is party.
Brigys v. Canal Co., 75.
13. Gas companies having right to use streets of city for their pipes may,
by certiorari, challenge legality of municipal proceedings designed to give sim-
ilar rights to rival companies, and individuals owning soil of street may also
question claim of a gas company to lay its pipes therein. People's Co. v.
Jersey City, 75.
14. Foreign insolvent corporation, if still in existence, can be compelled by
mandamus or bill in equity-to collect its unpaid subscriptions wherever stock-
holders may reside ; and if it has ceased to exist, receiver should be appointed,
and courts of other states would recognise right of receiver, same as they
would of corporation itself, if still in existence, to prosecute actions at law,
for recovery of unpaid subscriptions. Patterson v. Lynde, 542.
15. Unpaid subscriptions are trust fund for payment of debts of corpora-
tion, which is the trustee. When, therefore, corporation has ceased to exist,
then court of equity will take jurisdiction and wind up its affairs. Ad.
16. To enforce liability of stockholder for his unpaid stock, it is indispen-
sable that corporation (or if it has ceased to exist, all its stockholders and
creditors) should be before court. Id.
17. While foreign receiver should not be permitted, as against claims of
resident creditors, to remove assets of debtor, yet he may be allowed to do
so when resident creditors have no fixed legal claim to the property; so,
when creditors have not fixed liens thereon, he may sue for unpaid subscrip-
tions, and collect same, subject to order of court appointing him. Id.
18. If oficer of private corporation performs an illegal act, or such act (e. g.
excluding colored persons from omnibuses) is performed by his orders where
he has authority to control servant doing act, and injury results therefrom,
officer will be liable in damages to injured personalthough corporation may
also be liable. Peck v. Cooper, 542.
19. Retaining of servant of company after knowledge is brought home to
officer or agent of company of his misconduct, resulting in personal injury to
another, has been held evidence characterizing animas of those controlling
company, and as ingredient in measure of damages. Id.
20. Where act incorporating railroad company authorized'a mortgage of its
"charter and works" and exempted it from certain taxation, held, after fore-
closure under such mortgage and reorganization of company, that the exemp-
tion from taxation did not extend to reorganized company. Railroad Co. v.
Commissioners, 210.
21. Trustees of, who are liable under statute, in consequence of failure to
publish and file report of capital and debts within twenty days after first of
year, for "all the debts of the company then existing," are not liable for
amount of judgment recovered in suit in tort against company before first of
year in question. Chase v. Curtis, 342.
22. Although existence of corporations voluntarily organized under general
statutes, cannot be questioned collaterally, yet if they have resulted from
fraudulent combinations of individuals to procure powers, under circumstances
and for purposes not within legislative intent, who under shelter of their
charter are about to exercise powers oppressive to an individual, they may be
restrained by private suit of those injured, or about to be. Neimeyer v. Rail-
road, 75..
23. When proposed act of railroad company in taking land for its track is
unauthorized, it may be restrained by injunction. Id.
24. By-law of religious society provided for the dropping from its list of any
member ceasing to regularly worship with the society, or failing to contribute
to support of its public worship for one year. Held, that vote of society, after
hearing, was necessary. Gray v. Society, 273.
25. By-law of such society provided that object forwhich special meeting was
called, must be stated. Another by-law provided that new member must be
approved by vote of society. Held, that elections of new members at special
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meeting warrant for which contained no article for admission of new members,
but contained general article," To transact any other business that may legally
come before said meeting," were invalid. Id.
26. Where transaction with incorporated banking association properly per-
tains to business of such association, neither abuse or disregard of his authority
by managing officer or agent, nor his fraud or bad faith will be permitted to be
shown in defence of such bank in action against it by innocent party, growing
out of such transaction. Bank v. Blakesleyj. 343.
27. Creditor defrauded by misrepresentations of real capital of bank has
remedy in tort against all who participated in fraud, but entire body of creditors
who have not suffered from alleged fraud cannot recover from entire body of
stockholders who have'taken no part in it. Even where suit is prosecuted for
creditors by receiver, pleadings should set forth facts entitling each creditor to
action ; and it is essential that creditor should have acted on the misrepresenta-
tion to his injury. Fouche v. Brwer, 141.
28. Steamship company transferred its ships and other property to another
company organized to succeed it, and officers in old company became officers in
new, and business went on under their direction. After transfer, man was
killed by collision between canal boats and one of steamships transferred to new
company. His widow sued and obtained judgment against old company. Held,
that property transferred to new company could not be subjected in equity to
payment of this judgment. Gray v. Steamship Co., 681.
29. Secretary of joint stock company issued share certificate signed by him-
self and under seal of company (which had been improperly affixed), and with
forged signature of a director. It was duty of secretary to have transfers
registered, to procure preparation, &c., of certificates and to issue them.
Transferee of person to whom forged certificate was issued, applied to company
to have shares registered in his name and was refused. Held, that transferee
was entitled to recover value of shares from company. Shaw v. Mining Co.,
90, and note.
30. Fire insurance company incorporated in Pennsylvania is entitled to bring
in Maryland court, for use of receiver of such company appointed in Pennsyl-
vania by decree which declared the company dissolved, but referred to the act
which authorized the decree, and which act authorized the appointment of a
receiver, "with power to prosecute and defend suits in the name of the corpora-
tion, or otherwise, and to do all other acts which might be done by such corpo-
ration, if in being, that are necessary for the final settlement 11 of its unfinished
business, an action to recover from Maryland policy holder assessment upon his
premium note, where the suit is not brought by receiver in his official capacity.
Lycoming Co. v. Langley, 210.
CORPSE.
1. Administrator has no such property in body of decedent as will enable him
to recover damages for its mutilation through negligence of railroad. Griffith
v. Railroad, 586, and note.
2. Semble. He may, however, recover damages in such case for destruction
of the apparel on such body. Id.
3. Rights of living persons over dead bodies. Id., note.
COSTS. See ATTORNEY, 4. EseoRs .&ND APEALS, 2. INFANT, 4.
COUNTY. See MUNICIPAL ConRPORATION.
COURTS. See COPYRIGHT. JUDGMENT, 2. MANDAMUS, 2. WILL, 4.
Decree of Orphans' Court, granting letters of administration, cannot be ques-
tioned collaterally. Plume v. Howard Ins., 75.
CREDITORS' BILL. See UNITED STATES COURTS, 3.
CRIMINAL LAW. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 10. EVIDENCE, 12. INTOXI-
CATING LIQUORS, 1. TRIAL, 6. WITNESS, 1, 2.
I. Generally.
1. In Kansas coercion of wife is not presumed, but is a question of fact for
jury. State v. Hendricks, 76.
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2. Person on trial for assault with intent to murder, is competent to testify as
to purpose for which lie procured instrument with which he committed assault.
Fenwick v. State, 745.
3. Former conviction is bar to any offence of which defendant might hay-
been convicted under indictment and proof in first case. Instance,'several
different sales of liquor. State v. Nunelly, 76.
4. At trial testimony of witness, identifying defendant by his voice, whom
witness has heard speak only once before occasion of commission of offence
charged, which was after dark, is competent. !ommonwealth v. .Hzyes, 543.
5. Person sentenced to imprisonment for infamous crime, without having been
presented or indicted by grand jury, as required by Fifth Amendment of Con-
stitution United Stares, is entitled to discharge on habeas corpus from Supreme
Court United States. Ex parte Wilson, 481.
6. Crime punishable by imprisonment for term of years at hard labor, is an
"infamous crime" within this amendment. Id.
7. In separate trial of one of two persons jointly indicted for murder, other
defendant, even while indictment is still pending against him on plea of not
guilty, may, with his own consent, be called as witness against co-defendant.
State v. Barrows, 142.
8. "Reasonable doubt," definition of, and instruction of jury as to what
proof of guilt the law requires. State v. Rounds, 142.
9. Prisoner is in jeopardy from time that jury is impannelled and sworn in
court of competent jurisdiction upon sufficient indictment ; and entry of nol
pros., or discharge of juror, after that, without his consent, operates as an
acquittal, except in cases of overruling necessity, as death or illness ofjudge or
juror, or inability of jury to agree on verdict. Whitmore v. State, 274.
10. At common law court trying party for crime committed within its juris-
diction, will not investigate manner of his capture in foreign state or country.
Ker v. People, 142.
11. Fugitive from justice guilty of offence for which he is subject to extra-
dition, has no asylum in foreign country. When extradited he cannot be tried
for any other offence than that for which he has been extradited, without first
being afforded an opportunity to return.' But this doctrine does not apply
when he has been brought back forcibly; and fof his illegal and forcible re-
moval from foreign country, the country alone can complain. Ad.
12. Where there is no extradition treaty no obligation to surrender criminals
exists ; but as matter of comity between friendly nations, great offenders are
usually surrendered on request. Id.
13. Confession of prisoner with proof that offence was actually committed by
some one, will warrant conviction. Milton v. State, 273.
14. Defendant cannot be convicted upon testimony of partakers in crime,
whether his guilt be in same degree or not, unless corroborated by evidence to
connect defendant with commission of offence ; corroboration is not sufficient,
if it merely prove corpus ddieti and circumstances thereof. Id.
15. Court will reverse judgment of conviction, in case of felony, where evi-
dence on which it is based is all circumstantial and of unsatisfactory character.
Province of jury and duty of court. Mooney v. People, 274.
II. Assault. See ante, 2.
16. Where assault and battery complained of were part of one preconcerted
affray, evidences of other fights engaged in by defendants in execution of their
unlawful purpose, is admissible. Rhinehart v. Whitehead, 746.
17. Gfne who goes to place with others with intent to get up fight with persons
there, may be liable for assault and battery committed in execution of that pur-
pose, although he did not actually participate in such assault. Id.
III. Bastardy.
18. Bastard may not be exhibited to jury for purpose of showing by its
likeness to defendant that it is his child. Hanawalt v. State, 746.
IV. Burglary.
19. Lifting of latch and pushing open closed door, with intent expressed in
statute, is a sufficient breaking. State v. Groning, 274.
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V. Carrying weapon.
20. Not necessary to prove that pistol was loaded. State v. Wardlaw, 76.
VI. Gambling. ."
21. Selling of pools on horse races, and keeping of rooms where such pools
are sold, do not constitute offence within statute prohibiting keeping of gaming
table or other place of gambling, and which declares that all games, devices
and contrivances at which money or any other thing shall be bet or wagered,
shall be deemed a gaming table. James v. State, 745.
VII. Larceny. See DuBEss, 2.
22. Possession of stolen property is not alone sufficient to sustain conviction.
It must appear that property was recently stolen; possession must be unex-
plained, and in some form involve assertion of property in possessor. S'hep-
herd v. State, 416.
23. At common law there are three cases in which conviction for larceny may
be sustained when apparent possession is in accused: 1st. Where accused has
mere custody of property, as contradistinguished from possession, as in case
of servants, guests and the like: 2d. Where he obtained custody and apparent
possession by means of fraud, or with purpose to steal property ; and 3d.
Where one has acquired possession by valid contract of bailment, which is
afterwards terminated by some tortious act of bailee, or otherwise, whereby
possession reverts to owner, leaving custody merely with former, and he felo-
niously converts property to his own use. Johnson v. People, 745.
24. Where owner intends to part both with title and possession, and pro-
perty is delivered in pursuance of such intention, person receiving it cannot
be convicted of larceny, although transfer was induced by fraud of latter, and
with a purpose to steal it. Id.
VIII. Manslaughter.
25. To constitute manslaughter, where there is no evil intent, it is sufficient
if the killing is result of reckless or foolhardy presumption, judged by standard
of what would be reckless in man of ordinary prudence under same circum-
s.tances.. Rule applied where woman died from treatment administered with
"her congent, of one who publicly practised as physician. Commonwealth v.
Pierce, 117, and note.
IX. Receiving Stolen Goods.
26. If pigeons are stolen from house in which they were confined by owner,
and are found in possession of person who bought them of another about two
weeks after larceny, latter may be convicted of such larceny if his possession of
pigeons is not satisf4ctorily explained. Commonwealth v. Deegan, 544.
DAMAGES. See ASSENDMENT. BAILMENT, 4. CosrsoN CARRIER, 16, 18, 25,
27. CONFLICT Or' LAWS, 1. CONTRACT, 5. CORPORATION, 19. EASE-
SIENT, 2. EQUITY, 17, 18. FOREER RECOVERY, 3. INsuRtANcE, 7. MA-
LICIOUS PROSECUTION, 2. NEGLIGENCE, 11, 16, 40. PLEADING, 5, 6.
RAILROAD, 2. TELEGRAPH, 2, 9.
1. In action for assault and battery where punitory damages are recover-
able, financial condition of defendant may be shown by evidence of his re-
puted wealth. Draper v. Baker, 142. See infra, 5.
2. Verdict of $1200 for assault and battery by spitting in plaintiff's face,
is not so large as to induce court to believe that jury were actuated by passion,
prejudice, or other improper motive. Id.
3. Measure of, for breach of contract to assign insurance policy to pur-
chaser of insured property is only the amount necessary to procure policy for
remainder of time it had to run. Dodd v. Jones, 34, and note.
4. Measure of, for breach of contract generally, especially in margin trans-
actions. Id., note.
5. On trial of action of trespass for assault and battery, plaintiff may give
in evidence pecuniary circumstances of defendant to enhance his damages, and
defendant may then give counter evidence ; but unless such evidence is given
by plaintiff defendant has no right to introduce proof on that subject, even
in mitigation of damages. Mulallin v. Stangerberg, 544.
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6. For death of any person are limited by statute to such as arise from
pecuniary injury to widow and next of kin. Injury received by some of next
of kin, by dissolution of partnership relation between them and deceased, is
not within statute. Injury claimed to arise by deprivation of such services and
counsel as father might probably give to his children, must be limited to such
services and counsei, as would be of pecuniary advantage. Demarest v. Little,
746.
7. Where injury claimed is deprivation of probability of receiving such
probable accumulations as deceased might have made if he had continued in
life, income derivable from funds invested, and which next of kin have
received, should not be taken into account, and due weight must b given to
contingencies which might diminish probable accumulations or divert them from
next of kin. Id.
8. In action of trespass against railroad for running cars over ground, title
to which, owing to failure to comply with certain statutory requisites, never
vested in railroad, hdd, that plaintiff should be confined to damages caused by
running cars over the ground. Railroad v. Boyd, 797.
DEATH. See ACTION, 2, 3.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See ACTION, 15. ASSIGNMENT, 11. ESCAPE.
ExEtInoN. PAYMENT, 1. SALE, 8, 9.
1. Property sold conditionally and delivered, without legal record of lien,
passes to assignee of vendee under Vermont insolvent law. Collender Co. v.
.Marshall, 620.
2. Contract by which vendee of billiard tables agrees to pay in monthly
instalments in one year entire value of tables, and if he so paid property was
to be his, and if not, vendor's, is a conditional sale and not ajlease. Id.
3. Where one in Vermont orders goods from party in New York on certain
terms, as to payment, &c., but they are shipped, consigned to vendor, and
accepted on different terms, Hedd, that contract was made in Vermont. Id.
4. Purchaser of real estate at execution sale may in equity avoid conveyances
previously made by judgment-debtor in ftaud of his creditors. Belcher v.
rnold, 416.
5. Right to recover property conveyed in fraud of creditors by debtor subse-
quently adjudicated bankrupt, is vested in assignee alone, and cannot be exer-
cised by creditors in case of assignee's failure to bring action within time
limited. McCartin v. Perry, 416.
6. Complainant recovered judgment at law against defendant's brother for
false imprisonment, and afterwards filed creditor's bill to set aside, as fraudu-
lent, two conveyances of land by brother to defendant. Evidence showed that
lands in fact belonged to defendant, although legal title had been in name of
brother. Held, that there was, against defendant, no ground of estoppel.
Lillis v. Gallagher, 416.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES. See EQUITY, 19, 20. EXECUTORS AND AVmiNes-
TRATORS.
DECLARATIONS. See EVIDENCE, 20.
DEED. See ACKNOWLEDGMENT. GIFT, 3. INFAiNT, 2, 3. NOTICE, 2. TRUST
AND TRUSTEE, 3.
1. Mother was induced by son, while she was in feeble state of mind, to
execute deed to him for her land, including her homestead, under assurance
and belief that it would not take effect until recorded, and grantee agreed not
to procure same to be recorded during life of grantor. Hdd, deed would not
take effect as to grantee, and grantor might destroy same at pleasure. Sands v.
Sands, 544.
2. B., being owner in fee of tract of land conveyed to his mother an undi-
vided third part of it during her widowhood. Subsequently B. and his wife
conveyed same land to W. by deed, granting clause of which states that gran-
tors conveyed unto W. "all their estate," &c., in "the following described
parts of tracts or parcels of land. ** * It is understood by the parties herein
mentioned, that the interest herein conveyed is the two-thirds of the above
VoL. XXXIH-104
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described land." Held, that this deed only conveyed toW. a two-thirds inter
est in the land described. Zittle v. Weller, 747.
3. Rule that of two contradictory or repugnant clauses in deed first shall
prevail, does not apply to supposed contradiction between parts of same clause.
Id.
DELIVERY. See BAILMENT, 1, 2, 4. GIFT.
DEMURRER. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 18. PLEADING, 5, 6.
DESCENT.
1. At common law, bastard has no right of inheritance. In Illinois, bastard
may, under statute, inherit from its mother, but not from its father, unless he
shall have married the mother and acknowledge child as his own. Stoltz v.
Doering, 544.
2. Descent and heirship of real estate are exclusively governed by laws of
country within which ptoperty is actually situated. Id.
DEVISE. See CHARITY, 2. WILL.
DIVORCE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, I.
DOMICILE. See ATTACHMENT, 1. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 3, 11,'14. PARENT
AND CHILD, 2.
1. Presence and intention to remain in place only while a student, do not
confer domicile. Presumption is against student's right to vote. Sanders v.
Getchel, 76.
2. Grandfather or grandmother of infant, when next of kin, is guardian by
nature of such infant; and infants having domicile in one state, who after death
of parents -take up residence at home of paternal grandmother and next of kin
in another state, acquire her domicile. Lamar v. .licou, 481.
DONATIO CAUSA MORTIS. See GIFT, 1, 2.
DURESS.
1. Note and mortgage given by mother to son's employer, from whom he had
embezzled, with protection of son from exposure and prosecution as controlling
motive, will be cancelled. Foley v. Greene, 416.
2. No action can be maintained upon promissory note, given by person under
arrest on complaint for larceny of property, exceeding in value $100, to owner
of property alleged to have been stolen, under agreement that complaint shall
be placed on file, plaintiff having received note with notice of circumstances ;
question of guilt or innocence of accused not open in such action. Gorham v.
Keyes, 482.
EASEMENT.
1. Burden of proof is on defendant who sets up prescriptive right to have
water flow on plaintiff's land from roof of his artificial structure ; not sufficient
to show that structure had been in same condition for more than twentyyears.
R7ooten v. Barnard, 76.
2. Plaintiff proving an invasion of his rights by defendant is entitled to at
least nominal damages. Id.
EJECTMENT. See MUNICIPAL CORtPORATION, 11. TnEsPAss, 2. UNITED
STATES, 2.
1. Where land is forfeited to state for non-payment of taxes, and state fails
to convey title to purchaser for reason of illegality in its sale, original owner
has better title than purchaser. Chandler v. Wilson, 798.
2. Person having for over twenty years a recorded deed of township of
mainly wild land, during the time lumbering on some portions of it and cul-
tivating others, does not thereby divest true owner of his title of certain lots
within township, such lots not having been occupied during that period of time.
Id.
3. Person who obtains title of three of five heirs of owner of land, deceased,
can recover only three undivided fifths of the land of a person in possession,
although latter person does not occupy under other heirs. Id.
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ELECTIONS. See DOIciLE, 1.
EMINENT DOMAIN. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, II. CORPORATION, 23.
EQUITY. See ASSIGNMENT, 7, 8. BANK, 3. BILLS AND NOTES, 10. CORPO-
RATION, 9, 10, 14-16, 28. ERRORS AND APPEALS, 3. EXECUTORS AND
ADmINISTRATOEs, 5. FRAUDS, STATUTE OP, 4, 12. HUSBAND AND WIFE,
20, 25, 27. NOTICE, 4. PARENT AND CHILD, 3. PARTITION, 2. PART-
NERSHIP, 10, 14. RAILROAD, 5-7. SALE, 5. SET OPF, 3. SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE.
1. Dismissal of bill on demurrer carries cross-bill with it. Johnamensen v.
Tauer, 143.
2. Where person seeks to reform instrument on ground of mistake, the mis-
take and exact form intention of parties requires instrument to assume, must be
indubitably shown. Keedy v. Nally, 798.
3. The application for relief must be made with due diligence, and time runs
from discovery of mistake. Id.
4. Will not interfere to remove cloud upop title in favor of party out of
possession, claiming under legal title, against antagonist who is in possession
under written title. Weaver v. Arnold, 682.
5. Motion by defendant in hill, to set aside interlocutory decree, and for leave
to file new answer, is addressed to discretion of court, with which higher court
will not interfere, unless discretion has been abused. Schmidt v. Braley, 482.
6. Proper practice in case defendant desires to file new answer, is to prepare
and submit it with motion for leave to file. .d.
7. In action to reform contract and for relief thereunder, after same is
reformed, court may specifically enforce same, or give adequate compensation
for its non-performance. Railroad v. Steinfield, 482.
8. On trial of action to reform and enforce or rescind written contract, there
may be given in evidence the original writing made by same parties, and also
the subsequent acts done or procured to be done by party charged with fraud,
and which tend to prove fraud or mistake. Id.
9. On such trial it is error to order contract set aside if party complaining
neither pays back nor offers to return money received by him under con-
tract. Id.
10. By practice of United States Supreme Court, decree pro confesso is not a
decree as, of course, according to prayer of bill, nor merely such as complainant
chooses to make it, but is made according to what is proper to be decreed upon
statements of bill assumed to be true. Thompson v. Wooster, 417.
11. Defendants cannot allege anything in derogation of such decree, ure-
yoked, or question its correctness on appeal, unless on face of bill it appears
manifest that it was improperly granted. .d.
12. Delay of fourteen years in application for re-issue of patent is strongly
presumed to be unreasonable, hut court cannot say, as matter of law, that it is
not susceptible of explanation ; and this defence cannot be set up after decree
pro confesso. Id.
13. Where trustees of corporation gave bond, secured by mortgage on corpo-
rate property, which, in strict legal effect, bound them individually, court of
equity will enjoin action at law against them thereon, if it appears that there
was no intention on their part to become personally liable. Maps v. Cooper, 343.
14. Policy of insurance issued in name of agent of owner of vessel, instead
of in name of principal, through mistake of insurance company's agent in pre-
paring application, without any representation or mistake of owner or applicant,
may be rectified after loss of vessel, although agent signed application with his
own name "for applicant." Hll v. .nsurance Co., 416.
15. After decree disposing of issues and in accordance with prayer of bill, it
is not competent for one of parties without service of new process or appear-
ance, to institute further proceedings on new issues and for new objects,
although connected with subject-matter of original litigation, by merely giving
new proceedings title of original cause. &nith v. Woolfolk, 682.
16. If one complainant can, under any circumstances, have decree against
another upon supplemental or amended bill, it must be upon notice to latter. Id.
17. Court of, has no inherent power to ascertain damages by reason of tor-
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tious acts unattended by profit to wrongdoer. There must be some joint in-
terest of parties in the property for court of equity to assess the damages. In
case of trespass where no such relation exists equity will follow the rule of law
as to the damages. Atlantic Co. v. Maryland (o., 211.
18. The right to maintain action of quare lausun fregit exists in Maryland,
whether defendant committed the trespass unwillipgly or wilfully. If adjoining
owner has made mistake as to his title or boundaries in mining coal, lowest
measure of damages is value of coal immediately upon conversion, without
abatement of cost of severance. Equity cannot change this measure. Id.
19. It appearing that two sons had worked their father's farms, under agree-
ment that they should do so until they had accumulated for him a fund of
$12,000, and then they should have the farms free of rent during his life, and
that specified sum had been gathered about a year beibre father's death, and
thereafter sons bad enjoyed use of farms free until father died ; Held, that sons
had no reason to complain, on appeal, that chancellor had made too small an
allowance to them for services rendered under that contract. Larison v. Pol-
henuts, 343.
20. Parties who in pleadings and proofs, have insisted that they were not
accountable to him for rental value of land of which ancestor died seised,
because they were in possession as equitable owners, cannot, at hearing, shift
their ground, and claim that they were tenants of ancestor's widow, who might
have been entitled to hold the land until her dower was assigned, but who has
disclaimed such right. .d.
21. Favorite son induced mother to make conveyance of all her estate to him,
upon assurance that it would not take effect in her lifetime. Mother was 73
and greatly weakened in body and mind from disease and sickness, so as to be
incapable of transacting business, and proof showed deed was not intended by
her to have effect before her death, but was handed to son to be placed with
her papers, and upon her recovery she destroyed deed. Held, that trial court
erred in decreeing that mother execute another deed in place of one destroyed,
and in dismissing her cross-bill to have conveyance made set aside. Sands v.
Sands, 544.
22. Statements by defendant who was subsequently arrested on a ne exeat,
made to complainant's lawyer, that if suits should be begun against him, and he
should be likely to get the worst of it, or if any order should be made against him
by any court, his lawyer would find it out beforehand and would let him know,
so that he could and would leave the state before they could do anything with
him, accompanied by other statements, that complainant and her father were
poor, and that he would law them both to death if they attempted any suits
against him, and that he had put all his property out of his hands, but still had
the benefit of it, are sufficient, on application for discharge, to hold him in cus-
tody under the ne exeat. Cary v. Cary, 417.
ERRORS AND APPEALS. See ADMIRALTY, 2. CONSTITUTIOwAL LAw, 12.
CRIMINAL LAW, 15. INFANT, 7. PRACTICE, 1, 2.
1. Opinion of lower court not part of record in United States Supreme Court.
England v. Gebkard, 211.
2. Supreme Court United States, upon dismissing writ of error for want of
jurisdiction, can adjudge to defendant in error costs incident to motion to dis-
miss, but no others. Bradstreet Co. v. Bigg ins, 482.
3. Decrees in favor of complainants in creditor's bill, for certain sums of
money, are several, and one whose decree is for less than $5000 cannot appeal
to Supreme Court United States. Stewart v. Dunham, 682.
4. Judgment of State Supreme Court was, that judgment of State District
Court be reversed with costs, with directions to County Court to enter judgment
upon findings for plaintiff as prayed for in his complaint. Held, final for pur-
poses of writ of error to United States Supreme Court. Mower v. Fletcher, 417.
ESCAPE.
1. Ancient rule that debtor in execution, by voluntary escape became dis-
charged both from imprisonment and debt, leaving creditor to look to sheriff
alone for debt, is no longer in force, and upon such escape he may be re-arrested
and imprisoned. People v. Hanchett, 274.
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2. Where debtor has been legally arrested by sheriff under ca. sa. running
in name of people, and is enlarged on bond for his appearance, on day set for
hearing of his application for discharge, court, on refusing discharge, may order
him back into officer's custody without process in name of people, and this may
be verbally done. People v. Hanchett, 274.
ESTOPPEL. See AGENT, 4. COM.1ON CARRIER, 9. CONTRACT, 6. Conco-
RATION, 2. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 6. EXECUTION, 4. HUSBAND AND
WIFE, 8. REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 7.
If A. is informed by B., adjoining owner, that B. proposes to erect wall on
his own land, at his own expense, and A. assents to building of wall according
to B.'s line, as established by survey of C., A. is not estopped to maintain writ
of entry against B., after wall has been built, for land erroneously included in
such survey, if in so assenting be acted under mistake of fact. Proctor v. Putnam
Co., 212.
EVIDENCE. See AccoUnT, 1. ADMIRALTY, 3. AGENT, 7-9. ATTORNEY, 3.
BURDEN OF PROOF. CORPORATION, 19. CRIMINAL LAW, 2, 4, 13-16, 18,
20, 22, 26. DAMAGES, 1, 5. EASEMENT, 1. EQUITY, 8, 22. EXPERT.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 11. HIGHWAYS, &c., 2, 6, 7, 9. INFANCY, 4. IN-
SURANCE, 8, 9, 14. INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 1. NEGLIGENCE, 7, 8, 11, 30.
PARTNERSHIP, 7, 12, 13. POSSESSION, 3. SUNDAY, 4. STATUTE, 3. TELE-
GRAPH, 5. TORT, 3. TRIAL, i. UNITED STATES COURTS, 2. WITNESS.
1. Matters of practice in another state may be proved by testimony of law-
yers in that state. Blackwell v. Glass, 77.
2. Justice's judgment from another state cannot be proved by certified copy
of his minutes. The original minutes mast be produced, or copy verified by
witnesses who have compared it with original. Id.
3. In action for personal injuries court may, in proper case, at the trial direct
plaintiff to submit to personal examination by physicians on behalf of defendant.
White v. Railiay Co., 527, and note.
4. But it is not error for court to refuse to so order, in absence of any show-
ing that justice would be promoted thereby, and especially so when plaintiff
submits to such examination in presence of jury. Railroad Co. v. Finlayson,
532, and note.
5. When official reporter is not present at trial to take down exact words-
court having made no minutes-and counsel disagree as to what witness said
on material matter, question is for jury; and this although defendant moved
for nonsuit. Porter v. Platt, 752.
6. In such case testimony of attorney, with his minutes taken on trial, is not
admissible to strengthen or weaken that of witness given on same trial. Id.
7. Whether physician is qualified to testify as an expert upon questions of
insanity, is question of fact for presiding judge, whose decision will only be
reviewed in extreme cases. Fayette v. Chesterville, 799.
8. Skilful and reputable physicians, although not expert upon subject, may
testify to mental condition of their patients when they have adequate oppor-
tunity of observation. But this does not embrace ease where single examina-
tion was made by physician to qualify himself as witness in pending litigation.
Id. See EXPERT.
9. In action for personal injury plaintiff's attending physician testified that
he had examined plaintiff, who stated the symptoms, and that he had suffered
pain. Being asked whether plaintiff was feigning or "making believe," wit-
ness ansitered, "No, sir; I know lie (lid not, from examination and tests."
Held, that with (he explanation as to his means of knowledge, there was no
error in admission of evidence. Chicago Railroad Co. v. Martin, 483.
10. It does not even require an expert to know existence of pain from nature
of injury and patient's outward manifestations. Id. See also Tierney v. Rail-
way Co., 669.
11. Directions given to stranger with reference to delivery of baggage, by
baggage-master while away from baggage-room of company engaged in trans-
action of his own private businese, are not binding on company. City v. Ray-
nard, 212.
12. In prosecutions for assault words uttered during continuance of main
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transaction or so soon thereafter as to preclude hypothesis of concoction or pre-
meditation, whether by active or passive party, if relevant, may be proved as
any other fact, without calling party who uttered them. Fkynn v. State, 274.
13. Party cannot call and examine witnesses to support general character of
another witness, or himself, as a witness, for truth and veracity, until character
of witness has been directly assailed. Tedens v. Shumers, 545.
14. That due bill is found in hands of maker is prima facie evidence of its
payment. Id.
15. If plaintiff shows by preponderance of evidence that defendant owes him
on due bill, notwithstanding its surrender, defendant must overcome that evi-
dence by a preponderance, to defeat recovery. Id.
16. Contradictory declarations of witness, whether oral or in writing, made
at another time, cannot be used for purpose of impeachment until witness has
been examined upon subject, and his attention particularly dirccted to the cir-
cumstances in such way as to give him full opportunity for explanation or excul-
pation, if he desires to make it. The Charles Morgan, 682.
17. If contradictory declaration is in writing, questions as to its contents,
without production of instrument itself, are ordinarily inadmissible. Circum-
stance may, however, excuse its production. All law requires is that memory
of witness be properly refreshed, which court is to determine. Id.
18. Where A., desiring to talk over telephone with B., asked operator to
call him, and operator thereupon had conversation with B., reporting to A., who
was standing by, what B. said as it came over the wire, held, in subsequent
action between A. and B., former might prove, by himself and others, what
operator reported to him as coming from B., operator being called and not
remembering conversation. Sullivan v. Kuykendall, 442, and note.
19. Fact of mailing letter, properly addressed, with postage prepaid, creates
no legal presumption that it was duly received; but is merely to be weighed
along with other evidence in determining the question. Id.
20. On question of pedigree declarations are admissible: 1. When it appears
by evidence dehors, that declarant was lawfully related by blood or marriage to
person or family whose history the facts concern ; 2. That declaraut was dead
when declarations were tendered, and 3. That they were made ante litem
motam. Rule applied in determining rightful distributees of intestate's estate,
as to declarations of intestate's sister that claimant was natural son of intestate.
Northrop v. Hale, 143.
21. In course of negotiation for lease, a paper was partly written by defend-
ant and handed to plaintiff, and by him interlined and returned to defendant,
which paper was not signed by either of the parties. On trial question was
whether terms of lease were those mentioned in paper only, or there were other
terms agreed upon outside of it. Held, that paper was admissible as part of
res gestce. Freeman v. Bartlett, 747.
22. THE LAw OF JUDICIAL NOTICE, 553.
EXECUTION. See ExEmrTxoN. JUDICIAL SALE.
1. Merchant tailor, who is head of family and resident, is entitled to exemp-
tion of such portion of his stock as he may select up to statutory limit of value ;
and this right is absolute, and does not depend upon any claim or selection to
be made by him. Bice v. Nolan, 275.
2. Claim of exemption on morning preceding sale upon order of attachment,
is not too late. Id.
3. Where stock in trade of debtor is mortgaged, he is entitled to an exemp-
tion of his own selection, free of all liability from debt up to full value of $400.
Id.
4. Where exempt property of defendant has been levied on by attachment,
and a few days before sale thereof defendant makes assignment for benefit of
creditors, with no reservation of such exempt property, but no proceedings are
taken under such assignment, and where plaintiffs do not claim the property
thereunder, and are not influenced or prejudiced thereby, defendant is not
estopped as against such plaintiffs from thereafter claiming attached property as
exempt. Id.
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EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. See ACTION, 3,7. CORPSE, 1, 2.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 9. REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 6, S. WITNESS, 4.
1. That same person is both trustee and executor will not enlarge or transfes
the powers from one capacity to the other. Long v. Long, 212.
2. A. died in Connecticut and letters of administration were taken out there.
There were no claims in Rhode Island against estate of A. Held, that Con-
necticut administrator could endorse promissory note due estate of A., so as to
enable endorsee to bring suit on note in Rhode Island. Mackay v. Curch,
683.
3. Promissory notes given to two joint administrators for debt due estate of
intestate, may be transferred and endorsed by one of them. Id.
4. If administrator of deceased partner has settled with surviving partners,
and his account has been allowed by Probate Court, it has no jurisdiction to
open account upon petition of administrator's successor, to which surviving
partners only are made respondents, on ground that settlement was induced by
their fraud. Blake v. Ward, 77.
5. When bill in equity was brought by administrator to set aside as fraudu-
lent against creditors conveyances made by deceased, and it did not appear
whether administrator held sufficient assets to pay expenses of administration ;
Held, that the bill instead of being dismissed might, if administrator lacked
funds to defray expenses of administration, be amended by setting forth this
fact and by adding creditors. Estes v. Houdand, 799.
6. THE POWER OF AN EXECUTOR WITH THE WILL ANNEXED OVER HIS
TESTATOR'S REAL ESTATE, 689.
EXEMPTION. See EXECUTION. PAIfTNERSHIP, 3. PATENT, 2. PENSION, 1.
Insolvent debtor who sells property which is subject to execution, and with
proceeds immediately purchases exempt property, will be presumed to have
done so with intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors ; but property so
purchased does not cease to be exempt. Only remedy of creditors is by
attacking sale of non-exempt property. Comstock v. Bechtel, 748 and 783,
and note. 9
EXPERT. See EVIDENCE, 7, 8, 10. HIGHWAY, 7.
. Non-professional witnesses having sufficient opportunities for observation
may give their opinions on question of insanity, having first stated the obsetved
facts. Boaughman v. Boughlian, 77.
EXTRADITION. See CRIMINAL LAW, 11, 12.
FACTOR. See BAILMENT, 2-4. CONTRACT, 5.
FENCE. See FIXTURE, 3. LANDLORD AND TENANT, I.
FERRY. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1. NEGLIGENCE, 5.
FIXTURES.
1. Boards in corn barn, used for permanent floor, and stone posts, deposited
upon farm for building necessary fences. Hackett v. Amsden, 748.
2. Trespass de bonis is proper form of action to recover for boards and posts;
as claim was not for breaking and entering, but for taking and carrying
away. Id.
3. Fence built by one person on land of another under parol agreement that
it might be removed at will of builder, becomes a fixture which will pass with
grant of land to bonafide purchaser without notice. Rowand v. Anderson, 483.
FOREIGN CORPORATION. See CORPORATION, 30.
FORGERY. See CORPORATION, 29.
FORMER RECOVERY. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 27.
1. Damage to goods and injury to person, occasioned by one act, give rise to
distinct causes of action. B,-unsden v. Humphrey, 369 and note.
2. A., claiming to be injured by collision with certain teams left in highway
by B., brought action against B. to recover damages. B. obtained judgment.
Held, that this judgment was bar to subsequent suit against town. Hill v.
Bain, 683.
882 INDEX.
FORMER RECOVERY.
3. A. recovered judgment in assumpsit against B. for money loaned; A.
afterwards brought ease against B. for alleged fraudulent and false statements
to obtain loan. Reld, that judgment in assunpsit could not be pleaded in
bar; but that value of judgment in assumpsit was to be considered as pro tanto
reducing the damages. Whittier v. Collins, 799.
4. Plaintiff was owner of certain land, and in 1867 and in 1868, but not
afterwards, defendants worked seam of coal lying under and near to plaintiff's
land, which subsided in consequence, and the injury was repaired by de-
fendants. In 1882 a second subsidence and injury occurred from same cause.
Held, that plaintiff was entitled to maintain action for damage done in 1882,
and that he was not barred by Statute of Limitations. Mitchell v. Darley Co.,
432, and note.
FRAUD. See BANiKRUPTCY. C0MON CARRIER, 16. CORPORATION, 26, 27,
29. DEBTOR ANb) CREDITOR, 4, 5. EXECUTORS AND ADniNISTRATORs, 4.
HUSBAND AND WIFE, 23, 24. INSURANCE, 26. MORTGAGE, 22. NEGO-
TIABLE INSTRUMENT, 2. PLEADING, 1. PossEssIoN, 2. LIMITATIONS,
STATUTE OF, 8. TORT, 6. TROvER, 1. WILL, 11.
1. Party not excused for want of care and prudence in signing contract with-
out reading it, if capable of reading, unless induced to do so by wilfully false
statements of party procuring his signature. Linington v. Strong, 275.
2. What is negligence in signing contract without reading same is question
for jury ; it is not proper to select certain facts, and tell jury that they afford
no evidence of negligence or want of proper care. Id.
3. To support action, false representation need not be adrressed directly to
plaintiff, if made with intent to influence every person to whom it may be com-
municated. Not essential that misrepresentation be sole inducement to purchase.
Caruill v. Jacks, 275.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See CONTRACT, 4. EXECUTORS AND ADZnxIS-
TRATORS, 5. EXEMPiION. PARTNERSHIP, 3. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 3.
1. Does not require that all terms of contract shall be agreed to or written
down at one time, nor on one piece of paper ; but the paper signed must be con-
nected with the other papers by internal evidence. North v. Merdel, 143.
2. Parol or simple contracts for sale of growing timber to be cut and severed
from land by vendee do not convey any interest in lands, and are not therefore
within statute. Banton v. Shorey, 799.
3. Doctrine of part performance to take parol contract for sale of land out
of statute, does not apply to contracts between tenants in common. Haines v.
McGlone, 418.
4. Where one tenant in common by parol contract sells his moiety of land to
co-tenant, and afterwards repudiates contract and conveys to another pur-
chaser with notice, latter cannot recover in equity except upon return to co-tenant
of his purchase-money and half of all taxes and cost of improvements paid by
him, and interest. Id.
5. When relied upon in defence to action for breach of contract, on ground
that it was not to be performed within year, should be pleaded specially. Far-
well v. Tilson, 143.
6. To defeat application of statute by happening of contingency, it must be
such as renders performance of contract possible within year. Id.
7. Effect is to be given to oral contract if proved, unless upon whole case it
appears affirmatively that it is not to be fully performed within year ; it is not
sufficient that it may not be. Id.
8. In determining question of time of performance of contract, it is proper
to consider circumstances and situation of parties, so far as known to each other,
and subject-matter of contract. Id.
9. Promise of executor to pay $5000 to one of testator's heirs-at-law, who
received ilothing under will, in consideration that he would forbear further op-
position to probate of will, claimed to have been made through undue influence,
is not within statute, and such forbearance is sufficient consideration. Bellows
v. Sowles, 620.
10. G. was refused credit by P. : M., who employed G. at time, told P. to
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let G. have goods, andi he would see it paid. The credit was given to M. and
was refused to be given to G. Held, that M.'s promise was an original under-
taking. Maddox v. Pierce, 343.
11. Plaintiff's house being mortgaged, he entered into parol contract with
defendant to purchase mortgage, sell house, and after satisfying mortgage debt,
costs, &c., to pay balance to plaintiff. Held, that plaintiff in assumpsit could
recover this balance and that contract was not within Statute of Frauds. lc-
Ginnis v. Cbok, 620.
12. REFORMATION IN EQUITY OF CONTRACTS TOID UNDER THE STATUTE
or FRAUDS, 81.
13. VALIDITY OF BONA FIDE VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES By SOLVENT.
DEBTORS, AS AGAINST PIOaR CREDITORS, 489.
GAMBLING. See CtInIZJAL LAW, 21.
GARNISHBIENT. See ATTACHMENT.
GAS COMPANY. See CORPORATION, 13.
GIFT.
1. To establish gift causa mortis evidence must show not only that person in
extremis distinctly designated thing given and donee, but also that property wai
presently to pass, and delivery. Newton v. Snyder, 418.
2. Delivery to third person for donee, is sufficient; but delivery to agent to
perform act or make delivery only after giverls death, would amount to nothing.
Id.
3. Deed for interest in land, unlike a will, must take effect upon its execu-
tion ; but it may be good as voluntary settlement, though it be retained by
grantor in his possession until his death, when circumstances, aside from reten-
tion of deed, do not show grantor did not intend it to operate immediately.
Cline v. Jones, 418.
GUARANTY.
1. Following letter was held not to create a continuing liability: "Gentle-
men : The bearer of this letter, my son-in-law, * * * wishes to place a stock
of groceries in his provision and meat store, in this place. To enable him to
' do this, I am willing to be responsible to you for the amount of groceries he
may order of you." Knowlton v. Hersey, 144.
2. In suit upon guaranty of payment of note owned by bank, fact that bank
held, before suit, assignment, through trustee, of patent right and some claims
for damages for alleged infringement, and was offered more for these than
enough to have paid note, such assignment having been made by principal
debtor; which patent and claims afterward prove valueless from adverse ruling
of courts, will not discharge guarantor, although he may have urged bank to
accept offer. It was bank's duty, as trustee, to obtain largest sum that could
be realized, and making mistake, while acting in good faith, will not subject
bank to loss. Kaufman v. Loomis, 144.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.
1. Guardian appointed in one state, of ward domiciled in another, where law
of latter is less strict as to investments of a guardian than that of former, will
not, in absence of express statutory. requirement, be held to the more rigid
rules of state of his appointment, when be has faithfully and prudently exer-
cised his discretion. Lemar v. Micon, 144.
2. Former guardian of plaintiff's ward pledged to defendant bank to secure
his own note two negotiable bonds owned by ward, on which was endorsement
tending to show ward's ownership, and which was seen by crashier at time of nego-
tiation. Held, I. That defendant was put upon inquiry, and that it was not
sufficient to only inquire of guardian. 2. That plaintiff could recover bonds in
action of replevin. 3. That settlement of guardian's account in Probate
Court did not affect title to bonds. Langdon v. Bank, 620.
HABEAS CORPUS.. See CnRirNAL LAW, 5.
HIGHWAYS, STREETS, BRIDGES. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 26, MU.
SfICIPAL COnPORATION, 6, 7. NEGLIGENCE, 1, 3, 6, 12, 36. WAY.
VoL. XXXIII.-105
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1. Use of street or sidewalk after notice that it is out of repair, is not neces-
sarily negligence. City v. Sclsmidlinq, 483.
2. In action against city to recover for personal injuries alleged to have
resulted from defective sidewalk, fact that walk was removed by city authori-
ties and better one substituted soon after injury occurred, may be considered as
circumstance tending to show that walk removed was out of repair, but it is no
evidence that city authorities had knowledge of defect before occurrence of
injury. Id.
3. Owners of bridge across navigable stream must use reasonable diligence
to prevent such accumulation of drift about bridge piers, either above or below
surface of water, as might endanger navigation. St. Louis, 6'c., Railway Co. v.
lleese, 622.
4. Owner of land through or along whose property public highway runs, has
absolute right to use portion of same for certain purposes, fQr temporary period
and in reasonable manner, taking care not to expose an object calculated to
frighten ordinarily gentle and well trained horses. Piollet v. Simmers, 235, and
note.
5. Travelling on Sunday cannot be set up as a defence by one sued for an
illegal obstruction of a highway. Id.
6. Where in such a case plaintiff had proved that other horses had been
frightened by the object in question, evidence was admissible to show that these
horses were skittish. .7d.
7. The horse having fallen.and died, witnesses familiar with horses may be
asked their opinion as to whether the object was calculated to frighten the
horse, and whether the mere fall or the fright could have killed him. Id.
8. Use of velocipedes upon sidewalk of street not necessarily unlawful.
Purple v. Greenfield, 484.
9. Opening about foot and half deep, little more than foot in width, and two
feet and a half long, was made six inches from line of sidewalk in town, to fur-
nish light and air to a cellar. There was nothing to indicate where line of
sidewalk ended. Opening had existed for some months, and was covered by
loose board, and was known to be so covered by chairman of selectmen of town.
While board was off, traveller stepped into opening. Held, that jury were
authorized to find that town had reasonable notice of hole, insecurely guarded,
mear highway. Id.
10. Town is not bound to erect barriers to prevent person travelling with
,horse and wagon from straying from highway, although there is dangerous
place 34 feet from marked travelled part of highway, and 9J feet from line of
location of highway, which he may reach by so straying. Barnes v." Chocopee,
.484.
HflOMESTEAD. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 16.
HOMICIDE. See ACTION, 2, 3. CRIINAL LAW, VIIL
HOUSE 0OF REFUGE. See CHARXITY, 1.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See ACKNOWLEDGMWENT. BANK, 2. BILLS AND
NOTES,'8. CRIMINAL LAW, I. INsu.AwcE, 17. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE
OF, '13. MORTGAGE, 6. PARENT AND CHILD, 3. SURETY, 5. TORT, 4.
WITNEss, 4.
I. Marriage, Divorce, and Alimony.
1. Guardian of insane woman cannot maintain action against woman's hus-
band for divorce and alimony, or for alimony alone. Birdsell v. Birdselt, 481.
2. Articles of separation which contain no express stipulation against divorce,
are not per se bar to divorce for causes existing prior to execution of articles.
Fosdick v.. Fosdick, 681.
3. That liberal divorce law of Rhode Island influenced petitioner for divorce
to come there, does not make him any the less a domiciled inhabitant of state,
if be came'bonafide to reside permanently. id.
4. Widow cannot maintain action against administrator of deceased husband.
'for fees of her -counsel for prosecuting suit against lhusband for divorce a mensa
et thoro, pendiag which suit he died. McCurley v. Stockbridge, 344.
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5. But counsel themselves can maintain such action, if it be made to appear
affirmatively that the divorce suit was justifiably instituted. McCurley v. Stock-
bridge, 344.
6. In absence of any statutory prohibition, marriage at common law may be
had per verba futuro cur copula; but the copula must be in fulfilment of the
agreement to marry, or in consummation of such contract. For the copula to be
available, parties must at time have accepted each other as husband and wife.
Stoltz v. Doering, 545.
7. Any unjustifiable conduct on part of husband which so grievously wounds
mental feelings of wife as to seriously impair her health, or such as utterly
destroys the legitimate objects of matrimony, constitutes extreme cruelty,
althlotah no personal violence is even threatened. Avery v. Avery, 276.
8. In 1864 Henry First, resident of Knox County, Ohio, absconded, desert-
ing his wife and children, and nothing was heard of him in that community
until 1880. In 1873 land in said county belonging to him in common with
others, was partitioned at suit of co-tenants, and his share of proceeds came to
custody of Brent, Clerk of Common Pleas. In 1879, with his wife's assent,
probate court appointed Bennett administrator of W. H. First, supposing that
to be true name of absentee, and he collected from Brent $174.21, the said
share of said proceeds. In October 1880, First demanded said sum from Brent,
and brought suit. Held, in absence of showing to contrary, presumption, from
facts stated, is that money was paid to wife, who was entitled to a year's sup-
port, on supposition that husband was dead ; and that, as she was entitled to
support out of his property during life, First's conduct estops him from claiming
that payment to her was unauthorized. Brent v. First, 212.
9. THE RIGHT TO ALIMONY AFTER DIvoRcE, 1.
II. Curtesy andl Dower.
10. Under French law, by marriage without contract as to property, com-
munity of property between husband and wife is established as an incident of
marriage. During coverture husband has control and management of commu-
nity property, and he may dispose of his half by will. Will of whole of his
property made by husband before marriage will not defeat wife's right. Harral
v. Harral, 344.
II. Person suijuris may change his domicile as often as he pleases. Natural-
ization in adopted country is not necessary. Id.
12. To effect change of domicile there must be voluntary and actual change
of residence with animus manendi. Id.
13. By French law marriage of foreigner in France without any contract as
to property, followed by establishment of conjugal domicile in France, will sub-
ject property of married persons to community law, and government author-
ization under Article XII. of code is not necessary to establishment of such
domicile. Id.
14. Husband with conjugal domicile in France was brought to this country
in 1878 and sent to hospital for insane in Philadelphia, where he died in 1881.
Hdd, that there was no change of domicile. d.
III. Separate Estate. See infra, 25, 27, 31-33.
15. Judgment obtained by husband and wife against railway company, for
injuries sustained by wife, cannot be attached for debt of husband. Clark v.
Wooten, 545.
16. Goods purchased by married woman on credit are not her separate pro-
perty ; npr can she acquire title to any property or business upon the credit of
its after-production. Lienbach v. Templin, 127, and note.
17. Where wife claims property as against husband's creditors, she must
show affirmatively, that she paid for it with her own separate funds. Id.
18. Feme covert brought suit for personal tort by her next friend. It
appeared on face of declaration that she had husband living. On general
demurrer, held, that suit should have been brought in name of husband and
wife jointly. Treusch v. Kamke, 748.
19. Suit at law will not lie on promise of husband to repay to wife moneys
received by him for her during coverture; but will against husband's executors
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on promise made by them officially to pay moneys so received by husband.
Rusling v. Rusling, 748.
20. Son advanced money to mother for her support, under agreement that
he should be repaid at her death out of her estate. Son procured from wife the
money advanced, agreeing that she should have account against his mother.
Equity will enforce the claim in behalf of wife. Titus y. Hoagland, 344.
21. Parol assignment to wife being unknown to mother, counter-claim which
she had against son at her death will be set-off against claim of wife. Id.
IV. Torts, Contracts, Conveyances, 6-c. See ante, 16, 18.
22. Legislation of New Jersey does not give married woman capacity to
make legal contract with her husband. Farmer v. Farmer, 418.
23. Wife may give her property to her husband, or make contract with him
which will be upheld in equity, but courts always examine such transactions
with anxious watchfulness and dread of undue influence. Id.
24. Where contract is made by parties holding confidential relations, the
burden, if contract is assailed, is on stronger party to show no advantage was
taken; otherwise fraud will be presumed. Id.
25. Contract by which married woman charges her separate estate in equity,
need not be in writing. Elliott v. Lawhead, 484.
26. Action founded on such contract, where personal judgment against mar-
ried woman is not authorized, is cognisable only in equity. Id.
27. Prior action to recover money judgment, in which it is sought to reach
same separate property by attachment, in which plaintiff fails, is no bar to
equity suit to charge such separate property. .Id.
28. Where by statute married woman is given use and disposition of her
earnings and property, husband is not responsible for her torts not committed
in his presence or by his direction. Norris v. Corkill, 135.
29. Under statute empowering married women to carry on any trade or busi-
ness on her sole and separate account, she is not authorized to become her
husband's partner. Fairlee v. Bloomingdale, 648, and note.
30. Where married woman, having separate estate or business, employs hus-
band to manage same, and agrees to pay him stated compensation, a chose in
action in his favor against her is created, which, on her failure to pay, can be
reached by judgment creditor of husband. Kingnan v. Frank, 469, and note.
31. Married woman who purchases real estate at trustee's sale, made under
direction of court of equity, and who only pays part of purchase-money, is
personally liable for balance. Fowler v. Jacob, 343.
32. Decree in personam againstffne covert for such balance, means only that
unless by given time she pays such balance, any of her separate property which
she would have right to pledge in order to pay or secure a debt, may be taken
in execution to pay what she owes on her purchase. Ad.
33. Married woman has power to charge her separate property with payment
of her debts, and whether she does so or not, is question of intent ; which may
be shown on face of obligation creating debt, or aliunde. Id.
34. MARRIED WOMEN TRADE I, 353.
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR. See MASTER AN SERVANT, 13. NEGLI-
GENCE, 12, 13, 35, 41.
INDIAN. See CONSTITUTONAL LAw, 18.
INFANT. See CoMMsoN CARRIER, 14, 15. DomiciLt, 2. GUARDIAN AND
WARD. NEGLIGENCE, 17. PARENT AND CHILD. WILL, 11.
1. Executed note for horse ; before majority rescinded contract, tendered
horse to payee (refused) and demanded note. Held, that avoidance and tender
annulled contract on both sides ab initio. Boyt v. Wilkinson, 683.
2. Deed of infant may be avoided after maturity, by any unequivocal act; a
reconveyance to another, not in privity with first grantee, disaffirms first deed;
and this, whether last be quit-claim deed, or deed with covenants of warranty.
Bagley v. Fletcher, 419.
8. Deed of infant will pass his estate subject to disaffirmance after maturity,
but covenants in his deed are absolutely void. Id.
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4. Infancy of defendant, in action for goods sold and delivered, cannot be
proved by affidavit made in chancery suit, to which plaintiff was not a party,
by defendant's father, since deceased ; there being no question of pedigree in
the case. Haines v. Guthrie, 170, and note.
5. When in court as suitor or defendant, becomes ward of court, whose duty
it is to see that his rights are protected. If general guardian fails to appear,
court should appoint guardian ad litem. And if the guardian fails to properly
protect interests of ward, it is duty of court, sua sponte, to compel him to do so,
whenever fact comes to knowledge of court. Court should see that proper
pleadings are made to present infant's defence. Lloyd v. Kirkwood, 621.
6. Where bill to establish and enforce resulting trust as against infant heir,
showed upon its face that alleged trust arose twenty-five years before suit, and
court rendering decree therein against infant failed to require guardian ad litem
to set up laches in defence, hdd, that court was justified in setting decree aside
on bill filed by infant. Id.
7. An infant sued by prochein arni. Afterwards attorney employed by infant
dismissed suit at her request. Motion was subsequently made by prochein ani
to reinstate case. On appeal from overruling of this motion, held, 1. That
infant was incompetent to appoint attorney or take any step in suit which could
bind her rights. 2. That court below was in error in refusing to reinstate suit.
3. That appeal could be taken from such refusal. 4. That infant, after reach-
ing twenty-one, could n t ratify and approve act of her attorney. Where infant
sues by prochein ami, latter is only person authorized to prosecute suit, and is
responsible for costs. While court, after majority of infant, can discharge
prochein ami, and give infant control of suit, it must make such equitable order
as will protect former from costs. Wainwright v. Wilkinson, 213.
INJUNCTION. See ACTION, 5. CORPORATION, 9, 10, 22, 23. EquITY, 13.
SCHOOL, 1. WATERS AND WATER-COURSES, 2. WAY, 5.
1. Issued when court has no jurisdiction, void. Willeford v. &ate, 77.
2. May issue to restrain active waste on property in litigation. .Ehardt v.
Boaro, 345.
3. Is proper remedy to prevent collection of taxes by distraint upon railroad
property, after tender of payment in tax-receivable coupons. Allen v. B. 6-
0. Railroad Co., 484.
INSANITY. See EVIDENCE, 7, 8. EXPERT. LUNATIC.
INSOLVENCY. See DEBTOR ANtD CREDITOR, 1. Lis PENDENS.
INSURANCE. See COrrlIcT Or LAws, 2. DAMAGES, 3. EwQUyt, 14.
MORTGAGE, 7.
I. Lffe.
1. Assignment of policy to person having no insurable interest, not void.
Mut. Co. v. Allen, 485.
2. Policy not avoided by omission in application to state slight disorders.
Ins. Co. v. Trust Co., 55.
3. Sum insured was by policy payable to wife or legal representatives of
assured. Hdd, that wife was entitled to this sum if she survived; if not, his
executor or administrator. Johnson v. Van Epps, 144.
4. In such case, whatever may be right of assured during lifetime of wife,
after her death he will have same power over policy as if it had been originally
payable to himself, his executors and administrators. Id.
5. Insurance of one's own life for benefit of one not a relative, is not void.
But if it were, only insurer can raise question: heirs of insured cannot. ld.
6. Although notices issued by insurance company required premiums to be
paid at 12 t., on day they fell due, yet where no such stipulation was in policy
itself, and, according to course of all previous dealings between it and assured,
literal compliance with this requirement had not been exacted, if right to do so
existed at all, it was waived, ald company could not insist on literal compli-
ance without notice before day of payment. Ins. Co. v. Garmany, 145.
7. Where policy provided for payment of premiums annually, and gave
assured right to continue insurance, if, after policy had been continued for sev-
eral years, company improperly refused to receive further premiums or to con
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tinue insurance, on suit brought therefor by assured, measure of damages was
amount of prexpiums paid with interest. Ins. Co. v. (3armany, 145.
8. If declaration on policy refers to it without annexing copy, and does not
set up contract inconsistent with policy, objection, when policy is offered in
evidence, that there is variance between policy and declaration, cannot be
maintained. Pierce v. Ins. Co., 545.
9. If declaration on polic7 , which refers to it, is not demurred to, it is no
ground of exception to admission of policy in evidence, that declaration con-
strued in connection with policy is ambiguous. Id.
10. Declaration on policy need not allege facts which defeat part of plaintiff's
claim under special provisions of policy. Id.
11. Policy on life of A. was payable on his death to his wife and children,
and their assigns; and if he survived certain day, was payable to him. Held,
that he had assignable interest therein. Id.
12. Policy provided that if assigned, written notice shoula be given insurer.
Assignment was made, and notice given and acknowledged. Held, not to
amount to promise to pay assignee, and that he could not sue in his own name. Id.
13. Policy, in consideration of payment of annual premium, insured life of
A. in certain sum, or after due payment of premium for two or more years, in
case of default in payment of any subsequent premium, for as many tenth parts
of original sum as there should have been complete annual premiums paid. In
margin were words and figures denoting that one-half annual premium was pay-
able in cash, and one-half by note. Held, that these words and figures formed
part of policy, and that, if annual premiums were paid, half cash and half by
note, " complete annual premiums" were paid. -d.
14. In action at law on policy payable at day named therein, evidence is
inadmissible, in defence, to show that different day should have been writ-
ten. 'Id.
15. In such action plaintiff can recover interest only from date of writ, unless
in declaration lie alleges demand before that time. Id.
16. If policy is payable ninety days after due notice and satisfactory evidence of
death of person whose life is insured, or, if he survives certain day, is then pay-
able to him, ninety-day clause has no application to latter contingency, and
interest is not payable except as damages for wrongfully withholding the
money. Id.
17. A. took out policy on his wife's life, payable in four years to her if living
and if not living to himself. He paid premiums, retained policy and received
payments made upon it. She was living at maturity of policy, but had filed
petition for divorce. Statute secured to a married woman and her representa-
tives benefit of all policies not exceeding in aggregate $10,000, taken out on life
any person and expressed to be for her benefit. Eeld, that wife was entitled to
amount due on policy. Ins. Co. v. Mason, 419.
18. Certificate of membership issued by association organized under provisions
of Ohio Revised Statutes. sect. 3630, "for the purpose of mutual protection and
relief of its members, and for the payment of stipulated sums of money to the
families or heirs of the deceased members," which, by its terms, is made pay-
able to the assured, "or any person designated by his will or his heirs, if no
person is designated herein or by will," does not authorize such member, by testa-
mentary appointment, to constitute person beneficiary of such insurance, who is
not of family of assured, or may not, upon his death, become his heir. Aia
Association v. Gonser, 345.
19. F. took out policy payable to M., his wife, and his children, of whom he
had four by former wife. Subsequently child was born to F. and M. After-
wards F. and M. transferred their interest in policy by unsealed instrument, as
collateral security for debt of F., and instrument and policy were delivered to
creditor. No question was made as to validity of transfer. Held, 1st. That
policy was executed, irrevocable, voluntary settlement in favor of wife and
cbildren in being when it was taken oat. 2d. That F. and 3K. could pledge or
assign policy to extent of their interests in it. 3d. Policy being for $5000, that
one-fifth was due to creditor and one-fifth to each of four children. 4th. One
of children having died a minor before F., that one-fifth due this child should be
paid to his legal representative, if any, and if none, to administrator of F.,
child's father and next of kin. Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 800.
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20- Y. was member of Mutual Benevolent Association, whose object was to
provide and maintain fund for benefit of widows and orphans of deceased
members. Its articles provided that upon death of member, secretary should
notify each member, who should within thirty days of date of notice pay to
secretary $1.10, and in case of failure to pay, his name should be dropped and
he should forfeit all claims upon association ; but any member might be rein-
stated by giving satisfactory excuse himself or through his representative to
directors; also that notice directed and sent to post-office address or residence
of member as recorded in secretary's books, should be deemed legal notice.
On August 29th 1882, notice of two assessments was sent to post-office address
of Y. No payment or tender of assessments was made, and Y. died two days
after expiration of thirty days. He was taken sick September 13th 1882, and
was for most of time between that date and time of his death, delirious and
entirely incapable of attending to business. In action by widow, held, 1st.
That obligation to pay death assessment was personal to member, and in case
of his default lie ceased to be member, and forfeited all claim upon association.
2d. That receipt of notice need not be proved. 3d. That the sickness did not
excuse default. Yoe v. Alut. Ben. Ass., 546.
21. ASSIGNHENTS oF LIPE INSURANCE POLICIES, 753.
II. Fire.
22. Temporary illegal use of property insured, not contemplated at time of
taking out policy would only vitiate it during time of such illegal use, even if
policy is by its terms to become " void," in case of such illegal use ; and when
that stopped it would revive. Hinckley v. Ins. Co., 770, and note.
23. Absolute condition in policy on dwelling-house that policy shall be void
if building " be vacated or left unoccupied" avoids policy, although vaca-
tion results from permanent removal of tenant of insured during running
of lease, without knowledge or consent of landlord. Farmers' Co. v. Wells,
485.
24. Absence at time of loss and failure to return in time is sufficient legal
excuse for assured's not furnishing proofs of loss, within thirty days thereafter,
signed and sworn to by him, as required by policy; in such case proofs may
be signed and verified by agent having charge of his business. German Co. v.
Grunert, 485.
25. In such case where notice and proofs were furnished within required time
by the agent, and company returns same with objections, and they are amended,
and afterwards sent back for amendment, several times, this will be held
waiver by company of objection that such notice and proofs were not delivered
in proper time. Id.
26. Where policy provides that any false swearing or attempt at fraud, "1 or
if there shall appear any fraud in the claim, by false swearing or otherwise,"
shall avoid such policy, company, in order to avail itself of the defence, must
show that assured knowinglyl swore falsely or said or did that which is claimed
to be fraudulent. Ins. Co. v. Grehan, 345.
27. Policy reserved to insurer right to repair or rebuild upon notice of such
intention within 90 days after proof of loss. After such proof insurer served
notice of such intention "acting jointly with other insurance companies claim-
ing to be interested." There were ten policies in as many companies, eight of
which served like notices. Before time to rebuild expired, but while insurers
were taking steps for that purpose, plaintiff compromised with all of the eight
except defendant for amount of money in aggregate much less than amount of
these polities. Defendant's policy provided that assured should not recover of
company in greater proportion of loss or damage than amount thereby insured
bears to whole sum insured on said property, without reference to solvency or
liability of other companies. Held, 1. That liability of defeidant was several,
and that service of above notice converted respective policies from contracts for
money indemnity into contracts of indemnity payable in repairing or rebuilding
to be performed in time named in policy, but if no time is specified then within
reasonable time. 2. That after policy had been thus converted into building
contract, insured might settle with some of companies without releasing others
from their proportionate share of loss. 3. That such proportionate share was
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to be ascertained without regard to settlement by or insolvency or non-linbility
of other companies. Good v. Ins. Co., 800.
INTEREST. See APPORTIONMENT. ATTORNEY, 2. INSURANCE, 15, 16.
USURY.
1. Receipt of, in advance upon overdue promissory note, from maker, does
not of itself import such giving of time as will discharge surety. Haydenvillc
Bank v. Parsons, 479.
2. Payments and endorsement of payments, upon promissory note in which
no rate of interest is expressed, of interest at seven per cent., in respect of time
after note has become overdue, do not amount to change of contract, or satisfy
statutory requirement of agreement in writing to bind maker to pay that rate
in future. Id.
INTERNATIONAL LAW. See CRIMINAL LAW, 10-12.
1, Treaty is primarily compact between independent nations, depending for
its enforcement on their honor and interests. Its infraction becomes subject of
international reclamation and negotiation, which may lead to war. With this
courts have nothing to do. Head v. Money Cases, 213.
2. But treaty may also confer private rights on citizens or subjects of con-
tracting parties enforceable in court of justice. United States Constitution
makes treaty, while in force, part of supreme law of land ; but in this respect,
so far as provisions of treaty can become subject of judicial cognisance in
courts of country, they are subject to such acts as Congress may pass for their
enforcement, modification or repeal. Id.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See CONSTITuTIONAL LAW, 22. CRIMINAL
LAW, 3.
1. At trial of one indicted for keeping liquor nuisance, it is not error to
refuse to allow juror to be asked on his voire dire whether he has contributed
money for prosecution of persons generally who are charged with keeping such
nuisances. State -v. Hoxsie, 797.
2. If club of men buy and own in common liquors, to be delivered by their
steward only to actual members upon receipt of checks previously obtained
from him at five cents each, such delivery, bona .fide made, is not illegal, and
he is not indictable for unlawfully keeping liquors with intent to sell. Com-
monwealth v. Pomphret, 65.
JUDGMENT. See ACTION, 5, 9. CORPORATioN, 5-7, 21. COURT. ERRORtS
AND APPEALS, 4. EVIDENCE, 2. MORTGAGE, 18. SET-OPT, 1, 3.
1. Action can be maintained on domestic, although in full force, and time
within which execution can issue has not expired. Bummer v. Lamphear, 41,
and note.
2. Where circuit court adjourned over thirty-two days, it was held that
period intervening in which court did not transact business was to be regarded
as vacation, within meaning of that word in sect. 66, of Illinois Practice Act,
authorizing judgments by confession in vacation. But the word is not to be
understood as embracing all the time court is not actually in session, or as em-
bracing time of adjournment from day to day. Conkling v. Ridgely, 485.
JUDICIAL SALE. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 4. UNITED STATES, 4.
1. Execution on judgment pending appeal is irregular, but not void; sale of
land thereon, if not set aside on motion by defendant, made in proper time, will
pass his title. Shirk v. Road Co., 145.
2. Defendant only, not those acquiring title from or through him, can ques-
tion validity of sale of land under execution for irregularity; especially in
collateral proceeding. Id.
JURISDICTION. See REMtOVAL OF CAUSES, 7. UNITED STATES COURTS, 4.
Objection to, may be raised at any stage of proceedings by motion to dismiss.
Nile v. Howe, 680.
JUROR AND JURY. See CRIMINAL LAw, 15. TRIAL, 2,5.
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LANDILORD AND TENANT. See INSURANCE, 23. NUISANCE. TENANTS
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11. To remove bar of statute an acknowledgment of a subsisting debt must
be unqualified; and if the acknowledgment be coupled with qualified or condi-
tional promise,'there must be proof that the condition has been performed, or
the event happened, by -which the promise is qualified. Parker v. Butter-'
worth, 77.
12. Payment on account by one joint promissor will not remove bar of statute
as against co-promissor in whose favor statute had attached when payment was
made. Id.
13. Acts constituting real and personal property of married woman her sepa-
rate estate and authorizing her to sue and be sued alone, held, not to repeal by
implication saving clause in statute securing to married women right to main-
tain actions within respective times limited after such disability is removed. Ash-
ley v. Rockwell, 801.
14. Statute should begin to run against action for malicious prosecution of civil
suit from time civil suit terminates, by analogy to action for nalicious prosecution
of criminal suit, except in cases of seizure of personalty under execution, where
litigation is protracted by claim of person whose property is seized, when action
accrues and statute begins to run at time of seizure. Pintup v. Smith, 146.
LIS PENDENS. - See NoTIcE, 3.
While proceedings were pending against A. and B., co-partners, for appoint-
ment of receiver under proceedings in-insolvency, A. made an assignment of his
individual property to C. Held, that receiver was entitled to order upon A.
and C. for conveyance of assigned property. Petition of Arnold, 801.
LUNATIC. See HuSBAND AND WIFE, 1. INSANITY.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. See ACTION, 9. LiMITATIoNs, STATUTE
or, 14.
1. Action for, in obtaining and levying order of attachment upon personal
property, may be maintained against corporation. Western Co. v. Wilmarth,
486.
2. In such action where it is alleged in petition that stock of goods was levied
on the attachment and withheld from owner for about two months, and thereby
his business completely broken up, it is not error to receive evidence showing
value of stock ; that owner was doing business from $6000 to $7000 per annum,
-with net profit of $1500 to $1600 per year, and that on account of attachment
proceedings his business was broken up, as in such case exemplary damages are
allowable. Id.
3. Action for damages does not lie for arrest upon civil process of witness
(without writ of protection) returning home from court. Remedy consists in
application for discharge ; most expedient mode being by summary motion.
Smith v. Jones, 78.
4. Person ordering such arrest of wituess maybe punished for contempt. Id.
5. Person who has procured arrest and imprisonment of another on lawful
warrant is not liable to action for false imprisonment, although his object was to
enforce payment of debt. Mullen v. Brown, 547.
6. Action for false arrest does not lie against officer for serving precept issued
by inferior magistrate, if magistrate has jurisdiction of offence alleged, and
precept indicates a proper cause. Amendable irregularities do not vitiate. To
render officer liable precept must be absolutely void. Elsemore v. Lonofellow,
146.
7. Judicial finding in first action in favor of defendant in malicious prosecu-
tion suit, and against other party, by court of original jurisdiction, is conclusive
of p)robable cause, when not procured by unfair means, even if reversed on
appeal. Welch v. Railroad, 420.
8. Where defendant claims that he acted under advice of counsel, it is for
jury to say whether the attorney consulted being the attorney in civil sait to
recover of plaintiff the sum alleged in criminal proceeding to have been em-
bezzled, was therefore an improper person to consult. Watt v. Corey, 78.
MANDAMUS. See TzLEPHoxE, 1, 3.
1. Right to writ of, to enforce performance of official act by public officer
depends upon his legal duty and not upon his doubts. State v. Trpen, 622.
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2. Will not issue to inferior court to compel it to conform its judgment to
finding in case, when motion to amend judgment in that particular has been en-
tertained, and refused because court was of opinion that judgment had been
correctly recorded. Exparte Morgan, 420.
3. Where duty rests upon railroad company to construct viaduct over its
tracks at crossing of public street in city, mandamus will ordinarily lie; and
the action may in some cases be prosecuted in name of state by county attorney.
State Y. Railroad, 276.
MARRIAGE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, I.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See CHARITY, 1. CORPORATION, 18, 9. M-U-
NICIPAL CORPORATION, 8. NEGLIGENCE, 41. PARENT AND CHILD, 4.
TORT, 4. TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 4.
1. Master and mate of vessel are fellow-servants. Mathews v. Case, 146.
2. So, also, are foreman and laborers engaged in repairing dam for log-
driving company. Doughty v. Penobscot Co., 146.
3. Train despatcher not fellow-servant with employees in charge of train.
Darrigan v. Railroad, 452, and note.
4. It is duty of railroad company to devise some suitable and safe method
of running special trains, so as to avoid collision, and where method employed
is to have trains controlled by train despatcher, latter as to employees in charge
of train stands in place of company. Id.
5. Conductor of railway train not fellow-servant of engineer, but represents
company. Chicago, 6-c., Railway Co. v. Ross, 94, and note. See infra, 8, 10,
and 11.
6. Liability of master for injury to servant, generally. Id., note.
7. Where person placed his mare at livery, and instructed servant of pro-
prietors of stable to take her out for exercise, such, however, being no part of
the contract of livery, and while the servant had her out for such purpose, she
died, proprietors of stable cannot be held liable to owner, though mare died in
consequence of immoderate riding and carelessness of their servant. Adams v.
Cost, 346.
8. Head blacksmith of railway company was directed with other employ-
ees to go on wrecking train to certain place to remove wreck. Train was under
charge of engineer, who acted also as conductor, and by his negligence train
collided with another, andl blacksmith was killed. Held, that they, as well as
the other employees on train, were fellow-servants. Abend v. Railroad Co.,
277. See ante, 5.
9. On single track street railroad north-bound car ran beyond its side track, and
passenger at request of driver, assisted in pushing it back. While so engaged,
and without fault, he was injured by carelessness of driver on south-bound car.
Held, 1. Plaintiff did not engage in service of company as mere volunteer.
2. Under circumstances he cannot be considered as feUow-servant with driver
of south-bound car. McIntire Rd. v. Bolton, 486.
10. Car inspectors and yard hand are not fellow-servants; and railway
company is responsible for negligence of former by which latter is injured,
being bound to use reasonable diligence to keep machinery and instrumentali-
ties for its employees suitable and safe. Tierney v. Railway Co., 669. See
ante, 5.
11. In such case it will not be presumed that plaintiff assumed risk of negli-
gent inspection, unless it appear that he undertook to handle cars in course of
his employment without relerence to inspection. Id.
12. Railroad corporation is liable to employee for injury occasioned by being
struck by bridge-guard, if guard is out of its proper position because of wearing
out of rope attached to guard, and corporation has not made suitable provision
to have notice of, and to remedy, defects liable to be occasioned by its use.
Warden v. Railroad Co., 277.
13. One who contracts with mining company to break down rock and ore for
certain distance to disclose vein, at stipulated price per foot, company to furnish
steam drill and keep drift clear of rock, as the contractor broke it down, is to
be regarded as contractor with and not servant of company. He is not fellow-
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servant of superintendent of company under whose direction work is performed.
Mayhew v. Sullivan Co., 146.
14. Passenger in hired coach may, by words or conduct at the time, so
sanction or encourage special act of rash or careless driving as to debar him from
suit against third person for injury resulting from co-operating negligence of
both parties, or make Aim responsible for injury done by driver. But the negli-
gence of the driver, without some co-operating negligence on his part, cannot
be imputed to passenger. N. Y, L. E. 6- W. Co. v. Steinbrenner, 684.
15. In action by workman against employer, for personal injuries caused by
fall of staging upon which he was at work, it was in dispute whether defendant
undertook to furnish staging as a whole, or whether lie undertook merely to
provide, and did provide, materials from which fellow-servants of workman
erected staging. Judge instructed jury that master is liable to servant for
injuries resulting from defective materials negligently furnished by him,
although negligence of fellow-servant contributes to accident, and on question
whether obligation of master extended to furnishing of staging as completed
structure, read and affirmed on their respective -theories the instructions
requested by each party. Held, that plaintiff had no ground of exception.
Clark v. Soule, 276.
MECHANICS' LIEN. See UNITED STATES, 4, 5.
1. Ordinary mechanics' lien laws should not be interpreted as giving a lien
upon roadway, bridges or other property of railroad company that may be
essential in operation and maintenance of its road. Commissioners v. Toomey,
547.
2. Is purely statutory remedy and while courts construe laws liberally and
allow proper amendments, yet all proceedings must be in substantial accord
with.main requirements of statute. Kenly v. Sisters of Charity, 802.
MERGER. See SET-OFF, 3.
MINES AND MINING.
1. One member of mining partnership has right, without consulting his associ-
ates, to sell his interest in partnership to stranger, and such sale does not dis-
solve partnership. Bissell v. Foss, 420.
2. Discoverers of lode or vein posted at point of discovery plain sign, body
of which was : "We, the undersigned, claim 1500 feet on this mineral-bearing
lode, vein or deposit." Held, that this meant 750 feet on course of lode in each
direction from that point, and that notice was not deficient. Erhardt v. Boaro,
347.
3. Grant of patent by United States for land located or claimed for valuable
deposits, is a determination binding on rival claimant, whether he asserts his
claim or not; and if patent includes that part of rival's claim wherein was situ-
ated his discovery shaft, where all his labor was done, his whole location falls.
Gwillim v. Donnellson, 684.
MINOR. See INFANT. GUARDIAN AND WARD. PAR-ENT AND CHILD.
MISREPRESENTATION. See FtAUD, 3. EQUITY, 21.
MISTAKE. See EQUITY, 2, 14.
MORTGAGE. See ASSN.MENT, 3-5, 10, 11. BAILMENT, 5. BILLS AND NOTES,
8, 10. CORPORATION, 5, 6, 20. NOTICE, 1, 5. RAILROAD, 6, 7. RE-
CEIVER, 1. SALE, 2. TAX ANiD TAXATION, 1. USURY, L.
I. Generally.
1. Deposit of, for record, in recorder's office, sufficient to protect mortgagee.
Case v. Hargadine, 78.
2. Where possession is held by mortgagee adversely to mortgagor, princi-
ples of account are quite different from what they are when possession is held
in acknowledged character of mortgagee, and are applied with more or less
rigor against wrongdoer, according to circumstances. Booth v. Packet Co.,
548.
3. Presumption is that mortgage first recorded is first lien ; to overcome
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such presumption, it must be proved that the mortgagee, at or before time he
took his mortgage, had knowledge of the mortgage first in date. Hendrickson
v. Woolley, 347.
4. And if mortgagee of mortgage first in date has agreed with mortgagor
to keep his mortgage off record, in order that mortgagor may borrow more
money on the property to be secured prior to such mortgage, and such agree-
ment be made known to mortgagee of mortgage second in date, but first of
record, at or before its execution, priority of mortgage first in date is waived.
Id.
5. Where senior mortgagee forecloses his mortgage, and sells property, with-
out making junior mortgagee a party, or giving him notice, purchaser, whe-
ther senior mortgagee or stranger, acquires his title subject to right of redemp-
tion by junior mortgagee ; and same rule applies where junior mortgagee has
assigned all his interest in mortgage and the notes secured thereby, to third
person. fIolliger v. Bates, 802.
6. Married woman mortgaged her property to secure note of husband given
to raise money to pay debt of lumber company, of which he was president.
The money was raised by loan from insurance company on note of lumber com-
pany at one year, with the mortgage as collateral, and insurance company had
knowledge that mortgaged property was designed by mortgagor to serve as
surety for payment of loan. Without mortgagor's knowledge or consent, note
of lumber company at end of ybar was renewed, and soon thereafter surrendered,
and a new note, with other and different parties, was substituted, and twice re-
newed, and then extended. Held, that mortgage was released. Peop!e's Ins.
Co. v. McDonnell, 213.
II. Chattels.
7. Mortgagee of chattels which are insured by policy providing that loss
shall be payable to him as his interest may appear, is entitled to insurance money
to amount of mortgage debt, as against creditors of mortgagor garnishing insur-
ance company after loss, although mortgage was not properly filed. Afawson v.
Ins. Co., 749.
8. Where domestic animals are mortgaged during period of gestation, off-
spring when born will, as between parties, be covered by mortgage; but not
as against bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer, without notice of facts and
after period of nurture has passed. Funk v. Paul, 749.
9. One who takes mortgage of chattels to secure pre-existing debt which is
not yet due is not entitled to protection as bona fide purchaser or encumbran-
cer. Id.
10. Description of property as " Forty-one Berkshire hogs, and sixty-five
grain sacks," is not so uncertain as to invalidate mortgage. Knapp v. Deitz,
748.
11. Mortgage of chattels furnished by mortgagee to mortgagor and to le
used and consumed by him for benefit of mortgagee, is not %oid as to creditors
of mortgagor. rd.
12. Mode of alienation of personal property is governed by law of place
where owner resides, and where property is situated, and is not affected by
rule requiring change of possession ; thus chattel mortgage executed in New
York, and valid there, is valid in Vermont when owner goes into latter state
with property. Norris v. Sowles, 685.
13. After breach of condition mortgagor has no attachable interest in the
property.. Id.
III. Of Realty.
14. Failure to index mortgage which is recorded will not affect its lien or
validity. Barrett v. Prentiss, 685.
15. Payment by mortgagor after lie had sold and quit possession, rebuts pre-
sumption of payment arising from lapse of time, not only as to him, but his
grantees affected with constructive notice of mortgage. Id.
16. One who sells property and concurrently takes purchase-money mortgage,
retains such interest therein as may be taken in equity and applied on debt
secured by unrecorded mortgage given by vendor. Association v. Clark, 802.
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17. Purchaser from mortgagor of lands encumbered by unrecorded mortgage,
takes title free from such encumbrance, even if he has full knowledge and notice
of its existenck, and that it is unpaid. Association v. Clark, 802.
18. If creditor procures judgment against such purchaser after such unre-
corded mortgage has been recorded, his lien is valid as against such mortgage
Id.
. 19. Where money is loaned upon forged mortgage supposed to be valid, for
purpose of discharging prior valid mortgage, which is done, mortgagee of void
mortgage or his innocent vendee in regular course of business, may be subro-
gated to rights of prior mortgagee, there being intervening liens. Everstoa v.
Bank, 487.
20. If owner of land subject to two mortgages made by predecessors in title,
conveys it, reserving easement therein, to first mortgagee, by warranty deed, in
which grantee assumes both mortgages, first mortgage is extinguished, and sec-
ond mortgagee may maintain writ of entry against first mortgagee to foreclose
second mortgage. Kneeland v. Moore, 548.
21. Where sale of land is made, separate portions of which are subject to
separate mortgages, and vendee, as part of price, assumes payment thereof,
and subsequently vendor is compelled to pay one of them, vendee cannot main-
tain bill against vendor to redeem land from such mortgage without also paying
the other mortgage. Wells v. Tucker, 536.
22. Vendor executed release of his purchase-money mortgage, and took sec-
ond mortgage for balance unpaid. Release and second mortgage were intrusted
to vendee to record ; vendee recorded release but not the second mortgage,
which was returned to vendor, and by him recorded, after another mortgage
made after the second mortgage without consideration, had been recorded and
assigned to bonafide purchaser without notice. Held, that last mortgage was
first lien. Ramsey v. Jones, 622.
23. Purchaser of mortgaged premises from mortgagor, who assumes payment
of mortgage debt, or who knowingly accepts conveyance reciting his assumption
of same, will at once become personally responsible to mortgagee, and a release
from mortgagor will not avail him. Bay v. Williams, 486..
24. Acceptance of conveyance of mortgagor's equity of redemption, is
sufficient consideration for promise by grantee to assume and pay mortgage
debt. Id.
25. Express assent of beneficiary is not essential to his right to avail himself
of promise by one, upon valuable consideration moving from another, to pay
debt of that other to third person. Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See ACTION, 16, 17. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
12, 13, 19-22, 30, 33. CONTRACT, 1. HIGHWAYS, &c., 2, 9, 10. NEGLI-
GENCE, 1, 6, 12. O1PIoER, 1, 2. T.X AND TAXATION, 5, 6. WILL, 7, 8.
I. Generally.
1. Power to regulate wagons, drays, &c., conferred by Ark. Man. Corp.
Act of March 9, 1875, includes power to license. Fort Smith v. Ayers, 78.
2. Such license fee, when imposed as mere police regulation, is not a tax
upon an occupation ; if so large as to have been manifestly imposed for reve-
nue, it is, in effect, a tax, and not within statute. Id.
3. Common council of city, made by charter sole judge of election and quali-
fications of its own members, having once investigated and seated a member,
cannot at subsequent meeting order second investigation. State v. City, 749.
4. Shade trees on sidewalks and streets of city belong to it, and in grading
streets and sidewalks, may be removed if necessary; and adjoining property
owner certainly cannot recover therefor unless damage was caused by negli-
gence in the work. Castleberry v. Atlanta, 348.
5. City which undertakes celebration of holiday, under authority of statute
providing that city council may appropriate money for such purpose, exclu-
sively for gratuitous amusement of public, is not liable for negligence of its ser-
vants in discharging fireworks for purposes of celebration. Fndey v. City, 214.
6. Board of county commissioners is proper party to bring action to reim-
burse county for expense incurred by such board in rebuilding bridge upon
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county road within limits of village, which bridge had been injured by railroad
company in construction of its road. Commissioners v. Railroad Co., 802.
7. Statute of Limitations does not begin to run against such action until
complete restoration of bridge. Id.
8. Foreman of engine company in fire department of Baltimore was dis-
missed by fire commissioners for disrespect to superiors. In action against
city to recovery salary since dismissal, held, that defendant could not be held
responsible for determination of commissioners; and that their right of removal
being absolute, if there were no arrears of salary at time of dismissal, any
wrong done by commissioners must be redressed by action against them. Bal-
timore v. O'Neill, 803.
9. In relation to powers and privileges which are to be exercised by munici-
pal corporation for improvement of territory within corporate limits, and as to
which pecuniary and proprietary interests of individuals are represented, lia-
bility of corporation for negligence is largely, if not entirely, measured by
liability of individuals for similar acts; but with respect to police powers, such
as suppressing riots and unlawful assemblages, such corporation is, in absence
of statutory provision to contrary, agent of state, and not liable for failure to
perform or negligence in performing duties in that particular imposed by
statute. Robinson v. Greenrille, 347.
10. May acquire realty by possession and for other than municipal purposes.
New Shoreham v. Ball, 420.
11. In ejectment wherein plaintiffs title rested on possession for more than
twenty years, the locus was a long sandy waste along the seashore, and defend-
ants were mere intruders. Plaintiff, a municipal corporation, had by vote let
the locus year by year from 1829 to 1875. Court instructed jury that to show
title town must prove open, adverse, actual and exclusive possession for twenty
continuous years, and that the votes were not sufficient unless lessees took
actual possession, though town need not show that possession of its lessees was
continuous in sense of their being on premises all the time, and that if lessees
were in possession of any part of locus under the votes, it might be considered
they were in possession of whole. Held, that instructions did not entitle de-
fendants to new trial ; and that passage over locus by inhabitants of town to
get seaweed or sand, or use of same for temporary deposit of seaweed, would
not amount to interruption of possession. Id.
12. There being evidence to show that locus was known as the East Beach,
held, that it was for jury to determine whether or not town let locus by name of
the East B]each. Id.
IT. Bonds of.
13. Municipal bond issued under authority of law for payment, at all events,
to named person or order, of fixed sum of money at designated time therein
limited, being endorsed in blank, is negotiable security, and its negotiability is
not affected by provision of statute under which it was issued that it should b
"payable at the pleasure of the district at any time before due." Ackley School
District v. Hall, 277.
14. Consistently with Act of March 3, 1875, determining jurisdiction of
United States Circuit Courts. the holder may sue therein without reference to
citizenship of any prior holder, and unaffected by circumstance that munici-
pality may be entitled to make defence based upon equities between original
parties. rd.
15. By city charter its council had power to levy taxes on all property within
city "to pay the debts and meet the general expenses of said city, not exceed-
ing fifty cents on each one hundred dollars per annum on the annual assessed
value thereof." Subsequently the city was authorized to subscribe to capital
stock of railroad; and issued bonds in payment of stock it subscribed for.
Held, that authority to make the subscription carried with it right and duty to
levy and collect special tax, if necessary to pay subscription. Quincy r. Jackson,
347.
MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION. See INSURANCE, 20.
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NATIONAL BANK. See UNITED STATES CouRTs, 4.
That taxation of shares of, imposed by authority of state within which asso-
ciation is located, is no heavier than that imposed upon state bank shares, or
state saving institutions, does not prevent its being an illegal discrimination,
under sect. 5219 of Rev. Stat., if it results in capital so invested not being upon
same footing of substantial equality in respect of taxation by state authority as
other moneyed capital in hands of individual citizens, however invested.
Boyer v. Boyer, 348.
NATURALIZATION. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 11.
NAVIGABLE STREAM. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 26. HIGHWAYS, &C., 3.
NE EXEAT. See EQUITT,-22.
NEGLIGENCE. See ACTION, 4, 7, 23. ATTORNEY, 1. BANK, 4. CommoN
CARRIER, 7, 12, 17, 19-21. FORAIER RECOVERY, 2. FR4UD, 1, 2. HIGH-
WAYS, &C. MASTER AND SERVANT. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 4, 5, 9.
PARENT AND CHILD, 4. RAILROAD, 2-7. TELEGRAPH.
1. A town is not required to render way passable for entire width of located
limits. Morse v. Belfast, 803.
2. In determining whether way is safe and convenient within statute, it is
enough that it is so in view of such casualties as might reasonably be expected
to happen to travellers. What imperfections will render town liable is gener-
ally for jury. Id.
3. In action for personal injuries received by reason of defect in way ques-
tion, whether plaintiff or driver was in exercise of ordinary care, is for jury.
Id.
4. Failure to look or listen on crossing railway track will bar recovery, not-
withstanding negligence of railroad company in failing to give signals. Union
Pac. Railroad v. Adams, 487.
- 5. Person who, in passing from ferryboat to dock, puts himself in so dense
a crowd that he cannot see his footing, and gets his foot crushed between boat
and dock, has no cause of action against ferry company. Dwyer v. Railway
Co., 749.
6. When injury results to traveller on highway from combination of two
causes, one defect in highway and other a natural cause or pure accident (ice),
town is liable ; provided, injury would not have been sustained but for defect
in highway. Bampson v. Taylor, 685.
7. In action for personal injuries received by collision at railroad crossing,
evidence will not be received to show general character and habits of traveller
for carefulness, though injuries occasioned death before be could tell how acci-
dent happened, and no one saw him at time of collision. Chase v. Railroad Co.,
803.
8. In such case natural instinct for self-preservation does not afford proof of
absence of contributory negligence, though it may give force to facts already
proved. Id.
9. For injury resulting from fall into sidewalk of public street, communica-
ting with cellar of adjoining building, and left without guard or notice of
danger, owner and occupier of premises is liable. Houston v. Traphagen, 749.
10. Where it appeared that injured person stepped into unguarded opening
while his attention was attracted by objects in shop window above opening,
contributory negligence is not necessarily inferred. Id.
11. Where it is claimed that fall produced or excited disease, it should
appear, not only that fall was possible cause of disease, but other causes should
be so excluded and circumstances should be such as to leave reasonable infer-
ence that fall was actual cause. .d. See infra, 40.
12. Where city contracted for construction of cistern in street, and before its
completion horse fell into it and was killed for want of sufficient protection
around and over excavation, Held, that city was liable, although it only
reserved right to see that work was done according to specifications. City v.
Nendingq, 214.
13. Contractor entered into written contract with trustees of estate to take
down an entire building belonging to said trustees, "or so much thereof as the
trustees may request." "All of said work to be done carefully, and under the
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direction and subject to the approval of the trustees." Held, that he was
not an independent contractor. Linnehan v. Rollins, 214.
14. In Maine in actions against railroad companies for injuries to persons,
whether in form civil or criminal, burden is upon party prosecuting to show
absence of contributory negligence. State v. Main Co., 147.
15. One in full possession of his faculties, who undertakes to cross railroad
track at moment train is passing, or when train is so near that he is not only
liable to be, but is in fact struck by it, is prinzafacie guilty of negligence. Id.
16. In prosecution by indictment, against railroad company for negligently
causing death of person at crossing, the amount of forfeiture between minimum
and maximum sums fixed by statute, should be assessed by jury. .d.
17. Minor child, who being sui juris as to reasonable care of her person and
safety, lawfully and properly enters into conveyance driven by her parent, and
without fault on her part is injured by negligence of driver of another vehicle,
is not prevented from recovering damages because her parent has, by his negli-
gence, contributed to injury. Railway Co. v. Eadie, 706, and note.
18. If track of railroad company is put in position where trains, when close
to their transit over public street or road cannot be seen, that is an extra dan-
ger calling for more than ordinary cautionary signals; merely ringing bel not
sufficient. "Railroad v. Randel, 686.
19. Where traveller was crossing in wagon, at such a place, and flagman did
not notify him of coming of train until after it had begun to cross tracks, and
traveller then misunderstood warning and went forward when he ought to have
retreated, Reld, that such misunderstanding should not be imputed to him as
negligence. Id.
20. It is duty of person about to cross railroad track, to approach cautiously,
and endeavor to ascertain if there is present danger in crossing; and when
track and crossing are so situated, that approach of train cannot be seen, it may
be duty of person about to cross, to stop and look for train. Pennsylvania Co.
v. Franer, 622.
21. Contributory negligence wholly a question for jury. Id.
22. It is not contributory negligence per se for passenger to ride on lower
step of front platform of crowded street-car without objection by driver or con-
ductor. Railway Co. v. Gallagher, 734, and note.
23. Boy of thirteen got upon lower step of front platform of crowded street-
car, and rode for long distance as passenger, holding on with one hand. He
was finally knocked off by Jolting of car, run over and injured. Held, that
questions of negligence and contributory negligence, taking into consideration
age and capacity of lad, were both for jury. Id.
24. Absence of guard or fender on front platform of street-car may be con-
sidered with other facts in determining company's negligence. Court will not,
however, say, as matter of law, that it is negligence on part of companynot to
furnish such guard. Id.
25. General principle is, that where both parties by their negligence directly
contribute to accident, neither can recover. But plaintiff who has been negli-
gent or even reckless, may show knowledge, on part of defendant, of his peril
and that there was time after such knowledge within which to make effort to
save him, and then his own negligence will not prevent recovery. Instance,
traveller crossing railroad track without stopping to look and listen. Maryland
Co. v. Neuber, 349.
26. In absence of statutory requirement there is no legal obligation on rail-
road company to keep flagmen at crossings of public country road. Id.
27. Presumption that party acts from incentives of self preservation can only
be indulged in absence of proof to contrary. Id.
28. Person approaching railway crossing with team, and having reason to
suppose that regular passenger train had recently passed from one direction.
is not guilty of negligence if he fails to look constantly in that direction, espe-
cially when it would be impossible to see or hear approaching train because of
obstruction to sight and sound. Bowen v. Railroad Co., 147.
29. Instruction that it was duty of person approachingrailway crossing to
have looked up track, if by so doing he could have ascertained approach of
VOL. XXXIII-107
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train at sitocient distance to have avoided it, is proper. What was such suffi-
cient distance was for jury. Bowen v. Railroad Co., 147.
30. Question being whether bell was rung and whistle blown as locomotive
approached crossing, evidence that those things were not done at similar cross-
ing three miles distant was admissible. Id.
31. Where railroad employee was sent on wrecking train to assist in remov-
ing debris, and instead of taking his seat in car, in violation of published rule
of long standing entered locomotive and took seat with fireman, just in front
of latter, where he remained until collision with freight train, and he was killed,
held, that there could be no recovery, notwithstanding negligence of servant in
charge of train. Abend v. Railroad Co., 277.
32. It is sufficient to prevent recovery if negligence of person injured or
killed materially contributes to injury, whether it contributes to force causing
injury or not. Id.
33. In case of such voluntary exposure as above there can be no recovery,
even though negligence of defendant be gross, if its act be not wanton or wil-
ful. Id.
34. Where there is evidence tending to prove negligence on part of de-
fendant, and also evidence from which proper inference to be drawn as to fault
on plaintiff's part is doubtful, it should be submitted to jury to determine
whether plaintiff was injured by his own fault or that of defendant. Kelly v.
Howell, 215.
35. Contractor agreed with owner of mine to do certain work therein, owner
engaging to furnish and put up such props or supports for roof of mine as would
render miners secure, whenever notified by contractor that same were necessary.
Held, that actual knowledge was equivalent to such notice. If overseer of
mine acted in behalf of partnership of which he was member, and mine, at
time'of injury of employee through want of said supports, was in occupation
of firm, and the work was being done therein for firm's use and benefit, the
partnership will be liable for neglect to furnish and put up supports necessary
for safety of contractor's employees. Id.
36. Traveller upon street in city, crossing railroad track, has right to pre-
sume that trains will not be run at greater rate of speed than is limited by
city ordinance. Trial judge did not err in substantially directing jury to take
into consideration all objects and things at crossing of street and railroad, and
to consider what was done by deceased under all these circumstances, and in
saying that if they found that his action was that of person of ordinary pru-
-dence, they must also find he was not guilty of contributory negligence. Bart
v. Devereux, 214.
37. Rights of way of railroad company is exclusive property of such com-
pany, upon which no unauthorized person has right to be ; the mere acquies-
cence of company in use of same as footway, does not give right of way over
track, or create any obligation for special protection : B. g- 0. Railroad Co.
,v. State, 348.
38. Where person trespassing upon such right of way was run over and
-killed; and place where accident occurred, though within corporate limits of
Baltimore, was not upon any street or public way, held, that in absence of other
negligence, non-compliance with ordinance requiring that when locomotive is
used in city limits, a man shall be required to ride on front of same when
going forward, and when going backward, on the tender, not more than twelve
inches from road bed, did not, per se, render company liable. Id.
39. Upon street railway separate track was used for cars going in each direc-
-tion, and frogs were so placed as to prevent cars going in proper direction
from being thrown from track while going upon or leaving switch-bridge.
Loaded wagon having broken down on bridge upon one of tracks, car ap-
proaching thereon was necessarily lifted to other track, and being then driven
vapidly upon bridge, was thrown from track, injuring passenger. Held, that
company was not negligent in not placing frogs so as to prevent car going in
-wrong direction from being thrown off track, but that question whether the
ipeed was not negligent was for jury. White v. Railway Co., 527.
40. To justify assessment of damages for future or permanent disability, it
must appear that such disability is reasonably certain. .d. See ante, 11.
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41. Plaintiff's horse was frightened at steam shovel, and ran, throwing
plaintiff out of carriage and injuring him. Shovel was located on defendant's
land and used to obtain gravel to ballast its road-bed near highway in which
plaintiff was travelling. Defendant's evidence tended to show that shovel was
operated and wholly controlled by one M., an independent contractor, and his
servants, although its use was contemplated when contract was made. Held,
that work being lawful and shovel not a nuisance, until it became so by negli-
gent use, defendant was not liable unless relation of master and servant existed
between it and those operating shovel ; unless it not only prescribed end but
directed means and methods. Bailey v. Railroad Co., 685.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT. See BILLs AND NOTES. GUARDIAN AND
WARD, 2. MluxncisAL CotPORATION, 13.
1. Bonds of the United States are negotiable, though "called," until period
at which they were originally made payable; bona fide purchaser of such
bonds, which had been stolen, has good title. Morgan v. United States, 350.
2. Where by connivance of clerk in office of assistant treasurer of United
States person unlawfully obtains from that office money of the United States,
and, to replace it, pays to clerk money which he obtained by fraud from bank,
clerk having no knowledge of means by which latter money was obtained, the
United States are not liable to refund the money to bank. State Bank v.
United States, 487.
NOTICE. See BAw R, 2. BILLS AND NOTES, 9. EVIDENCE, 22. GUARDIAN
AND WARD, 2. HIGHWAYS, ETC., 1, 2, 9. MINES AND MIKING3 2. MORT-
GAGE, 3, 5, 17. NEGLIGENCE, 35. PARTNERSHIP, 12, 13. SALE, 6.
TELEGRAPH, 6.
1. Mortgage for $2000 was recorded as one for $200. Held, that record
was no notice of $2000 mortgage. Hill v. Mceichol, 147.
2. When purchaser of real estate, without notice of prior unrecorded deed,
for valuable consideration, conveys to one who had notice thereof, title of latter
is not affected. Id.
3. To subject purchaser to notice of lis pendens, in absence of actual notice,
purchase must be made from one who was party to suit at time. Marchbanks v.
Banks, 421.
4. Purchaser, though without notice of outstanding equities, is not an inno-
cent purchaser unless he has paid the whole consideration. Payment of part
and securing residue, are not sufficient. But he has an equity to reclaim out
of property, part innocently paid. Id.
5. B. sold to C. real estatt, placed him in possession, and agreed in writing to
execute to him deed on payment of purchase-money in monthly instalments.
Subsequently B. executed to A. mortgage on premises, which was recorded.
Held, that such mortgage was valid, but subordinate to rights of C. ; that C. or
his assignee may validly make payments of purchase-money to B. until A. or
his assignee by suit or otherwise asserts right to unpaid purchase-money.
Ramsey v. Hardy, 487.
NUISANCE. See LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 3, 4, 10.
I. He who creates nuisance on his own premises cannot escape liability for
its continuance by demising the premises, although demise stipulates that tenant
shall keep premises in repair. lngwersen v. Rankin, 750.
2. Landlord whose tenant during term has created nuisance on premises will
be liable therefor as soon as he has right of entry or power to abate ; and that
liability cannot be evaded by renewal of lease without his having taken actual
possession. Ad.
3. Qauwre, Whether knowledge of existence of nuisance is necessary to estab-
lish landlord's liability. Id.
O FICER. See CHARIXTY, I. CORPORATION, 18, 19. 31ALICIOUs PROSECU-
TION, 6. MANDAMUS, 1.
1. School agent's election and performance of duties,raise no implied promise
on part of town to pay him for such services. TaTbot v. East Mathias, 147.
2. In absence of implied contract or statutory provision entitling him to pay
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for official duties rendered, school agent can maintain no action therefor against
his town. Talbot v. East Mathias, 147.
3. Person whose baggage has been lost through negligence of public porter
licensed by city, may maintain action on bond given by him to city pursuant to
charter and ordinance, for faithful performance of requirements of ordinance
and safe delivery of articles entrusted to his care. City v. Raynard, 215.
ORDINANCE. See NEGLIGENCE, 38. SUNDAY, 5.
OYER. See PLEADING, 2, 3.
PARENT AND CHILD.
1. Parent who wilfully and negligently permits his son eleven years old to
possess a loaded pistol, whereby boy injures infant child of another, is not liable
in damages therefor. Hagerty v. Powers, 397, and note.
2. Widow marrying acquires domicile of second husband,-but does Dot, by
taking children of first husband to live with her there, make that their domi-
cile; they retain the domicile they had, before her second marriage, acquired
from her or from their father. Lamar v. .Micou, 148.
3. Parents of infant child lived apart, and mother supported it both before
and after lands were devised to it. Upon death of child parents became its
sole heirs. Held, that in equity mother was entitled to allowance out of child's
estate for amount expended by her upon its support. Pierce v. Pierce, 750.
4. Son, 28 years old, while living with father as hired man on his farm, took
father's horse and drove to depot to get one of his own friends. Father did not
know that son took horse until after he was gone; but expected and was will-
ing he should do so. Son had driven team before without permission. Horse,
tied to post in rear of depot, where father and son were accustomed, to hitch,
broke away, ran into plaintiff's team and injured him. Referee found that son
in tying horse "did not exercise prudence of an average prudent man." Held,
that father was not liable, but that son was ; that license to use horse could not
be inferred from fact of former use without leave. Way v. Powers, 621.
PARTICULAR WORDS AND PHRASES.
1. " Common Law." Walter v. Kirstead, 141.
2. "Exempted bylaw." Petition of Keach, 421.
3. "Legal Representatives." Johnson v. Iran Epps, 144.
4. "May." James v. Dexter, 624.
5. "Now sailed or abont to sail * *% with cargo." The Wickham, 209.
6. "Reasonable doubt." State v. Rounds, 142.
PARTITION. See TENANTS IN COMM ON, 1.
1. Not obtainable for land adversely held. Moore v. Gordon, 623.
2. Where case is fairly within law authorizing partition, the right to it is
imperative, and absolutely binding upon courts of equity. Hill v. Reno, 548.
3. In event that partition could be effected only through sale of premises'and
distribution of proceeds, that difficulties may arise in adjustment of distribu-
tion, or inconveniences, or even possible losses result from change in relations
of parties to estate, by reason of sale, will not affect absolute right to parti-
tion. Id.
PARTNERSHIP. See AGENT, 5. DAMAGES, 6. EXECUTORS AND ADMINIS-
TRATORS, 4. HUSBA1sn AND WIFE, 29, and p. 366. LIFE TENANT. MINES
AND MINING, 1. NEGLIGENCE, 35.
1. Partner cannot bind his copartner by warrant of attorney under his hand
and seal in name of firm without previous authority or subsequent ratification.
Ellis v. Ellis, 750.
2. Surviving partner in good faith but unsuccessfully resisting collection of
claim against partnership estate, will be entitled to contribution for reason-
able expenses of litigation. Lee v. Dolan, 421.
3. One partner may purchase partnership property, and if purchase is not
made with intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, and property is such as
is exempt, may hold it as against firm creditors. Burton v. Baum, 79.
4. Not dissolved by death of partner when partnership contract shows con-
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trary intention; as when it takes form of joint stock association, with trans-
ferrable shares, officers, records and general agent to transact business. McNeish
v. Odt Co., 686.
5. Whether intention was that partnership should not be dissolved by death
of partner is for jury to determine, on reasonable construction of articles of.
agreement interpreted by kind of business contemplated and manner of trans-
acting it. Id.
6. Dealing in hulless oats was main business of partnership, under control of
general agent, with provision that its "affairs" were to be kept secret. _ield.
that partners might be liable for common oats purchased by agent, although it
was not proved they knew of transaction ; and that it was their duty to see that
their aents transacted no business outside of scope of partnership. Id.
7. What agent said to vendor at time of sale as to who partners were and
what was their responsibility, was admissible evidence. Id.
8. Test of, as between parties themselves, is their intention ; as to creditors,
old test of participation in profits has been abandoned; question now is whether
business has been carried on in behalf of person sought to be charged as part-
ner. Culle.y v. Edwards, 623.
9. Where note and mortgage have been entrusted to firm of attorneys for
collection, mere dissolution of firm will not release one partner from responsi-
bility to client for money subsequently collected by other partner to whom that
business was, by terms of dissolution, transferred. Waldeck v. Brand, 148.
10. Partners may make any agreement they see proper for management of
their joint affairs ; but provisions of such agreements are liable, at least in court
of equity, to be controlled or qualified, or to be held altogether waived, when
assent of all partners may be fairly inferred. Hall v. &nnoner, 421.
11. One partner is not liable to another for honest mistake of judgment. Id.
12. In action against members of partnership upon promissory note, and
account annexed for goods sold and delivered, if one.of issues is whether plain-
tiff had notice of dissolution of partnership, notice thereof published in news-
paper is competent, in connection with other evidence tending to show that
plaintiff saw and read notice. Smith v. Jackman, 548.
13. In such case plaintiff testified that he had no knowledge of such dissolu-
tion until 'after bringing of action. Partner who alone defended action, was
allowed to put in evidence certain bills or statements of account for goods sold
and delivered to him personally by plaintiff at various times after cause of
action accrued. Held, no ground of exception by plaintiff. id.
14. Where member ofpartnbrship retires, and his copartners thereupon agree,
in good faith, to pay him sum certain as his share of capital, and firm afterwards
unexpectedly turns out to have been insolvent at time of said withdrawal ;
Held, that bank from which new firm bad borrowed money which they had
partly used in making payments to said retiring member, could not in equity
charge old firm with money loaned to new, nor retiring partner with moneys
obtained from it and used to pay him, retiring partner having paid in discharge
of debts of old firm, more than amount received by him as his share of capital
thereof. Penn Bank v. Furness, 488.
PATENT. See EQuITY, 12. TELarsoxn, 3.
1. Receiver of insolvent debtor is entitled to patent right belonging to debtor,
and court may order debtor to assign it. Petition of Keach, 421.
2. Words "exempted from attachment by law," mean, by statute. Id.
3. Novelty and increased utility do not necessarily constitute invention.
Hollister v. Benedict Co., 278.
4. Where one of two patents for infringement of which suits were brought,
expired before United States Supreme Court reversed decrees of Circuit Court
dismissing bills, it awarded accounts of profits and damages as to both patents,
and a perpetual injunction as to second. Valve Co. v. Valve Co., 278.
5. In order to obtain a re-issue for mere purpose of enlarging claim, there
must be both a clear mistake, inadvertently committed, in wording of claim
and application for re-issue within reasonably short time. Coon v. Wilson,
350. See infra, 7, and 9-11.
6. Use of old device for new purpose, if patentable at all, is only so when
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the result is new and different in character from the original; and then the
patent will be.for an improvement on the original invention. Blake v. City,
350.
7. Reasonableness of delay in applying for re-issue is for court, and decision
of patent office in granting re-issue that delay in application therefor had been
satisfactorily explained, will not avail complainant. Unexplained delay of five
years too long. Wallersak v. Reihrer, 549. See ante, 5 ; infra, 9-11.
8. In patents for combinations of mechanism, limitations and provisos
imposed by inventor, especially such as were introduced into application after
it had been persistently rejected, must be looked upon as in nature of dis-
claimers. &zrgent v. Hall Co., 421.
9. In case of re-issue whether there has been clear mistake in wording of
original claim, is, in general, matter of fact for commissioner; but whether
application is made in reasonable time is matter of law, whigh court may deter-
mine by comparing re-issue with origipal, and if necessary, with records in
patent office, when presented by the record. Maher v. Harwood, 148. See
ante, 5, 7.
10. No invariable rule can be laid down as to what is a reasonable time.
Court will exercise proper liberality towards patentee. By analogy to rule as
to effect of public use before application for patent, delay of more than two
years would in general require special excuse. Id.
11. As, in present case, there was delay of nearly four years, and original
patent was free from obscurity, held, that delay was unreasonable. Id.
PAYMENT. See EViDENcE, 14, 15, 20. LImiTATIOwS, STATUTE oF, 12.
MORTGAGE, 15. USURY, 4, 5.
1. Right of creditor to make application of payments to one of several debts
applies only to debts then due, and only when debtor himself makes no appro-
priation. Gates v. Burkett, 421.
2. Check of one bank upon another to order of buyer was by him endorsed
and sent to seller to pay for bill of goods, and seller sent receipt for bill, both
supposing check to be good, while in fact there were no funds to meet it at time
it was drawn or afterward. Held, that in action on account for goods sold and
delivered, plea of payment cannot be maintained. Fleg v. Sleet, 350.
PEDIGREE. See EviDENCE, 20.
PENALTY. See SUNDAY, 1.
PENSION.
1. Not exempt from execution after ithas come to pensioner's hands, notwith-
standing U. S. Rev. Stat., sect. 4747. Fien v. Garcelon, 804, and Crane v.
Linneus, 804.
2. One who loans money to pension claimant to enable him to establish his
claim, and to be repaid when pension money is received, is not debarred from
recovering his loan by U. S. Rev. Stat., sect. 5485. Crane v. Linneus, 804.
3. Verbal promise by pension claimant to pay debt when he receives pension,
is not such pledge, mortgage, assignment, transfer, or sale of pension'claim, as
is forbidden by U. S. Rev. Stat., sect. 4745. id.
PHYSICIAN. See CnexIxAL LAw, 25. EvIDENCE, 7-10.
PLEADING. See A.m[xnxENT, FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 5. INSURANCE, 8-10,
15. SLANDER AND "IEsL, 2.
1. Replication of fraud to plea of release must set out fraudulent acts relied
on. F iedburg v. Knight, 422.
2. Where pleading does not show that instrument of which profert is made
is under seal, oyer is not demandable. Mealy v. Ins. Co., 339.
3. Even though oyer be not demandable, if it appears that knowledge of
paper is proper or necessary for either party, it is practice of court to make
order for its production. 
1d.
4. Where state statute regulates practice in making such application, that
practice will be followed in the federal courts. .d.
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5. In action for personal tort, amount of damages claimed must be laid in
declaration ; if not, defect will be fatal on general demurrer. Treusch v. Kamke,
750.
6. Amount of damages claimed in such case is jurisdictional fact ; if over
$100, Common Pleas has jurisdiction; if less, justice of peace has exclusive
jurisdiction. rd.
PLEDGE. See B im, 1. INsURANcE, 19. LIITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 9. SALE,
2, 4-6.
POSSESSION. See MORTGAGE, 2, 12. MUNICIPAL COsPORATION, 10, 11.
NOTICE, 5. SALE, 7, 8. TROVER, 1.
1. Possession of life tenant is not adverse to estate of remainderman, and he
cannot make it so. Acceptance of deed from true owner granting life estate to
acceptor, with remainder over, waives any right latter may have acquired by
former adverse possession. Keith v. Keith, 215.
2. If A. is entitled to conveyance of land and, by agreement between A.
and B., in order to defraud A.'s creditors, land is conveyed to B., title thereto
by'adverse possession of more than twenty years may be acquired by A. against
B., although A. is without means to pay his debts during such possession, if
B. knows that A. is holding land adversely. Elwell v. Hinckley, 549.
3. At trial of writ of entry, if demandant relies upon title acquired by gran-
tor by adverse possession, books of assessors of taxes of town in which land
lies are evidence of assessment of land to demandant's grantor during period
of alleged adverse possession. Id.
POWER. See TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 3.
When a power, coupled with the trust, is given to two or more persons to
be executed by them jointly, and one renounces, other or others may execute
power as if originally given ouly to them. In this case one of the trustees
refused to act and survivor did not make appointment in his stead, as testator
desired him to do. Held, that sales and deeds mdide and given by the survivor
were valid. Petition of Bailey, 686.
PRACTICE. See EQUITY, 1, 6, 10-12, 1,5, 16. ESCAPE, 2. EVIDENCE, 1.
PATENT, 4. PLEADING, 2-4. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 1, 2. TRUST AND
TRUSTEE, 1.
1. Exception to modification, in charge, of proposition submitted, must be
specific. Ins. Co. v. Trust Co., 55.
2. In action at law, submitted to decision of circuit court, waiving trial by
jury, in which record does not show filing of stipulation in writing required by
sect. 649 of Rev. Stat., Supreme Court of United States, upon bill of excep-
tions and writ of error, cannot review rulings upon any question of law growing
out of the evidence, but may determine whether declaration is sufficient to sup-
port judgment. Bond v. Dustin. 216.
3. The filing of said stipulation is not sufficiently shown by statement in
record or in bill of exceptions, that "the issue joined by consent is tried by the
court, a jury being waived," or that "the case came on for trial by agreement
of parties, by the court, without the intervention of a jury." Id.
PRE-EMPTION. See UNITED STATES, 3.
PRESCRIPTION. See LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 3. WAY, 1, 2.
PRESUMPTION. See EQUITY, 12. EVIDENCE, 19. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 8.
MASTER AND SERVANT, 11. MORTGAGE, 15. NEGLIGENCE, 27, 36.
PUBLIC POLICY. See AGENT, 4. COMMON CARRIER, 22. INSURANCE, 5.
SUNDAY, 2-4. WILL, 6.
RAILROAD. See ACTION, 2, 3, 16, 17. AGENT, 5-9. ASSIGNMENT, 1. COX-
XON CARRIER. CORPORATION, 20, 23. DAMAGES, 8. MANDAMUS, 3. MAS-
TER AND SERVANT, 3-5, 8-12. MECHANICS' LIEN, 1. NEGLIGENCE, 4, 14-
16, 18-20, 22-26, 28-31, 36-39. TAX AND TAXATION, 1. WAY, 4, 5.
1. Charter to'run road from boundary between South Carolina and Georgia
to city of Augusta, and, with assent of railroads in Georgia, to join its track to
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theirs, did not confer power to run road through Augusta so as to connect with
another railroad. City Council v. Railway, 350.
2. In action brought against railroad company in behalf of next of kin, to
recover damages for injuries resulting in death of person, nominal damages may
be recovered, if it appears that death was caused by wrongful act or omission
of defendant, although no actual pecuniary damages may have been suffered.
Atchison Rd. v. Weber, 479.
3. Where conduct of passenger is such as to render his presence dangerous
to fellow-passengers or to occasion them serious annoyance and discomfort, he
should be excluded from train. Id.
4. Where unattended passenger becomes sick and unconscious or insane, it is
duty of railroad company to remove him from train and leave him until he is in
fit condition to resume journey, or shall obtain necessary assistance. Id.
5. Duty of company is not only to remove such passenger from train, but also
to exercise reasonable and ordinary care in temporarily providing for his pro-
tection and comfort. It is sufficient in case of such passenger without friends
or money, to properly remove him from train and promptly place him in charge
of overseer of poor. The statute making it duty of such overseer to grant tem-
porary relief to any non-resident found lying sick in the township or city, or in
distress and without friends or money, at expense of county. Id.
6. Where trustees for bondholders are operating road, under mortgage for
security of bondholders, they are liable, to extent of funds received, to keep
road, &c., in repair, furnish new rolling stock when necessary, pay running
expenses and apply balance to payment of damages from misfeasance in man-
agement of road, and after that to mortgage, as rights of parties may require.
Claim for damages to property by fire communicated by locomotive during such
period, does not depend upon proof of malfeasance, but is an incident to run-
ning of road, and may be considered part of running expenses, and is therefore
an equitable lien upon the funds liable in trustees' hands. Stratton v. Railway
Co., 79.
7. When trustees have conveyed to new corporation, formed by bondholders,
such funds subject to such lien, to that extent new corporation would be liable
in equity. Id.
8. In such case bill should aver that at time of alleged injury and demand for
payment, trustees had such funds, or subsequently conveyed such funds to new
corporation. Id.
RATIFICATION. See AGENT, 8, 9.
RECEIVER. See CORPonTIoN, 7, 14, 17, 27, 30. Lis PENDENS. PATENT, 1.
1. Fund collected by receiver appointed in action brought by junior mort-
gagee of land, is applicable to the liens in order of priority. Williamson v.
Gerlach, 6-23.
2. Maybe appointed to take charge of assets of insolvent corporation, to save
same from waste, before court acquires jurisdiction to adjudicate upon rights
of such corporation. Placing property in hands of receiver is in nature of
equitable attachment, whereby court, through its officer, acquires custody
of such property. Coal Co. v. Coal Co., 278.
3. In absence of statutory provision on subject, real estate cannot be vested
in receiver, except by conveyance to him. Id.
REFORMATION. See EquITy, 2, 3.
RELEASE. See ATvoRNEY, 5. GuAn.NTY, 2.
RELIGIOUS SOCIETY. See CHAxTY, 2. ConpoRATiox, 24-25.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
1. Separate answers to one cause of action, raising separate issues, do not
make separate controversies within second clause of section 2 of Act of March
3d, 1875. Ayres v. Wiswall, 79. See infra, 5.
2. In contest over ownership of stock in which it is sought to have the cor-
poration cancel certain shares standing in name of another and issue certifi-
cates therefor to plaintff, the corporation is a necessary party. Crump v.
7Turber, 549.
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3. Such corporations as Union Pacific Railway Co., and Texas and Pacific
Railway Co., created by and organized under Acts of Congress, are entitled,
under Act of March 3d, 1875, to remove suits against them, on ground that
they are suits "arising under the laws of the United States." Pacific Rail-
road Rem. Cases, 550
4. Where assignment of cause of action is legal and valid, fact that it was
made for express purpose of depriving defendant of right to remove case to
Federal court, will not invalidate it or entitle defendant to removal. Vinont v.
Railway Co., 724.
5. In action for damages for malicious prosecution of previous action, where
defendants separate in their answers, one party of them cannot claim that there
is a controversy wholly between themselves and plaintiffs, such as is contem-
plated by second clause of sect. 2, of Act of March 3d, 1875. Pins v. Toedt,
550. See ante, 1.
6. Where bond of administrator is by law taken to state, but is held for
security of persons interested in estate of the deceased, suit thereon, so far as
jurisdiction of United States Circuit Court is concerned, must be treated as
though person for whose use suit is brought was alone named us plaintiff.
Maryland v. Baldwin, 216.
7. Sect. 3, of Act of March 3d, 1875, prescribing time when petition for
removal may be filed, &c., is not jurisdictional but formal ; application in due
time and proffer of proper bond, as required by it, may be waived, either
expressly or by implication ; and party at whose instance removal has been
effected, is estopped from objecting that application therefor was too late.
Ayers v. Watson, 351.
8. Proceeding in state court against administrator, to obtain payment of debt
due by decedent in his lifetime, is removable into United States Court when
creditor and administiator are citizens of different states, notwithstanding state
statute may enact that such claims can only be established in certain state
courts. Hess v. Reynolds, 279.
9. Third clause of sect. 639, of Rev. Stat. (authorizing removals on ground
of prejudice or local influence), is not repealed by Act of March 3d, 1875. Id.
10. Application for removal, under said third clause, is in time if made
before trial or final hearing of cause in state court. Id.
REPLEVIN. See GUARDIAN AND WAnRD, 2.
Cannot be maintained for mass of cotton in which plaintiff's has been inno-
cently mixed by defendant, nor for undivided share. It must be first separated
and capable of identification. Hart v. Morton, 623.
RESIDENCE. See ATTACHMENT, 1.
SALE. See CONTRACT, 5.
1. Delivery of goods on sale for cash is not necessarily a conditional one, for
vendor may waive the conditions. Whether there has been such waiver is
question of fact. Ftshback v. Van Dusen, 506, and note.
2. To constitute executed contract of sale, pledge or mortgage of goods, some
specific property must be appropriated to the contract. Id.
3. Semble, where party delivers or deposits grain with another, with agree-
ment, expressed or implied, that latter may use and dispose of it, and return
equal amount of other grain of same quality, transaction constitutes a sale and
not a bailment. Id.
4. Pledge by warehouseman without segregation from uniform mass. .d.
5. Registered bill of sale of personal property which includes stock in trade
to be aterwards acquired, is as to such stock, only a contract to assign; vendee
cannot maintain trover for the property against bonafide pledgee, who received
such goods from vendor in ordinary course of business. .Toseph v. Lyons, 298,
and note.
6. In absence of anything to lead pledgee to believe bill of sale existed, he is
not chargeable with constructive notice by reason of failure to inquire. Id.
7. Of saw-logs piled on land so low and wet that it was impossible to remove
them, except on frozen ground, without cost exceeding value of logs, is valid as
against attachingcreditors, withoutchangeofpossession. Kingsley v. White, 750..
VOL. XXXIII.-108
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8. But if change of possession had been necessary, held, that facts that ven-
dor had sold and conveyed lot to third party by deed with only one witness,
that such third party, vendor and purchaser, with his attorney, went on lot,
and marked logs with purchaser's initials, third party agreeing to take care of
them for him, did not constitute sufficient change of possession, as it was not
found-and court could not infer it-that third party was in open visible posses-
sion of lot. Kingsley v. White, 750.
9. Where proposition to sell goods is sent by writing, that, by mistake, is am-
biguous, and knowing of such ambiguity, receiver of writing, claiming an
improbable meaning unreasonably favorable to himself, and not intended or
thought of by sender, and without notice to sender or inquiry of him as to his
intended meaning, orders the goods, obtains and uses them, he is liable to seller
for their value as if no proposition had been sent. Butler v. Moses, 488.
SCHOOL. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 13. OFICER, 1, 2. •
1. Injunction will not be granted to restrain reading of bible, or singing of
religious songs, in school, at suit of tax-payer whose children are not required
to be present during such exercises. Moore v. Monroe, 252, and note.
2. Sect. 1764 of Iowa Code, providing that the bible shall not be excluded
from any school or institution, nor shall any pupil be required to read it, con-
trary to parent's or guardian's wishes, is not in violation of article in Bill of
Rights, providing: "Nor shall any person be compelled to attend any place
of worship, pay *** taxes *** for building or repairing places of wor-
ship," &c. Id.
3. Power of school boards, generally. Id.
4. Teacher in public schools, in absence of rule of school board, has right to
adopt rule to prevent his pupils using profane language, fighting or quarrelling
on their way to and from school, and may punish those infringing the rule, by
use of rod. Deskins v. Gos, 663, and note.
5. Regulation that each scholar, when returning after recess, shall bring into
school-room, stick of wood for fire, is not " needful" for government, &c., of
schools ; and scholar cannot be suspended for refusal to comply with such reg-
ulation. State v. Board of Education, 601, and note.
SEAL. See AGENT, 2. BILS AND NOTES, 3. CORPOATiox, 29.
SET-OFF. See HUSBAD ND WiFz, 21.
1. Decree in admiralty on libel for damages may be set off against judg-
ment recovered in state court, parties in two suits being the same. Schantz v.
Kearney, 751.
2. Where suit was brought on physician's account for services and medicine,
it might be pleaded that he did itot do his work skilfully, or plea of recoup-
ment might be filed, springing out of contract; but plea of set-off, based on
tort in giving defendant too large a dose of medicine, which injured him to
amount of $200, was improper, even if defendant was insolvent. McLeroy v.
Sewell, 149.
3. Maker of separate note in suit may, in equity, set off joint note of plain-
tiff and another who are both insolvent. Holder of note who took it after
maturity holds it subject to every objection, including equitable set-off; to which
it was subject in hands of his assignor. Merger of debt into judgment is not
so perfect in equity as to preclude judgment creditor from resorting to original
demand and relations of parties to it, to enable him to disclose and assert equit-
able .set-off. Baker v. Kinsey, 216.
SHIPPING. See MASTER AND SERVANT, 1.
If hull and spars of vessel are completed at one port, and sufficient rigging
is put on her, and sufficient cargo for ballast is taken, to enable her to go to
another port, where materials necessary to rigging and equipment of vessel,
and first put upon her, are procured, materials so furnished at latter port are
furnished in "construction" of vessel. McDonald v. The Nimbus, 279.
SLANDER AND LIBEL.
1. Candidate for public office, conferred by popular election, puts his char-
acter in issue, so far as respects his qualifications for office; and whatever per-
INDEX. 859
SLANDER AND LIBIRL.
tains thereto is legitimate subject for discussion and comment, which must, how-
ever, be confined to truth, or what, in good faith and upon probable cause, is
believed to be true. Expresss Co. v. Cepdand, 640, and note.
2. In suits for libel, when defendant has asserted several inconsistent pleas in
his answer, inter alia, one justifying by asserting truth of alleged libellous matter,
failure to establish such plea is not to be taken as tending to establish malice,
and to aggravate injury done defendant. Id.
3. In action of slander petition charged defendant with having spoken certain
false, malicious, and defamatory words concerning plaintiff, while giving his
testimony before court having jurisdiction of subject-matter then on trial, in
answer to interrogatories put to him. Upon demurrer, held, 1st. That court will
presume, in absence of averment to contrary, that answers of witness were
within scope of inquiry pertinent to issue on trial, and that they were believed
by witness to be true. 2d. That upon statements of petition and presumptions
arising therefrom, witness was absolutely privileged. Liles v. Gaston, 351.
4. Certain citizens presented to their town council request that K. might be
removed from office of constable because, "firstly, said K. is a man utterly devoid
of principle, and uses his office more for the purpose of wreaking his personal
spite than for the peace and harmony of the community; secondly, said K. is
wholly ignorant of the duties of his office ; thirdly, said K. has at various times
heretofore maliciously and wickedly assaulted and arrested sundry persons who
were entirely innocent of the charges against them." Held, that statements
were not such as, if proved untrue, to imply actual malice. Kent v. .Borgartz,
683.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See EQUITY, 7, 8.
1. When, on decree for, defendant is in contempt for refusal to perform,
court may establish contract as if it had been executed, and enjoin and restrain
defendant from denying its execution and delivery. Whtarton v. Stoutenburgh,
351.
2. Such decree may be without notice, but defendant has right of appeal. rd.
3. Decreed against vendor's sole devisee in case of parol contract for sale of
land, when vendee, with assent of vendor, took open, actual possession of
premises in pursuance of agreement, made permanent erections thereon, promptly
paid taxes assessed thereon to him by direction of vendor and substantially per-
formed his agreement. Woodbury v. Gardiner, 804.
STATUTE. See CONSTITUTIONALLAW, 9, 10, 29, 32. EVIDENCE, 22.
1. May be repealed by implication by subsequent act covering whole ground,
Bracker v. Smith, 422.
2. In construing statute, punctuation may aid, but does not control, unless
other means fail, and may be changed or disregarded. Albright v. Payne, 351.
3. It is duty of courts to take judicial cognisance of public local laws,
within sphere of their operation, equally with public general laws. Slyner v.
3faryland, 351.
4. "IMay" means "shall" wherever rights of public or third persons
depend upon exercise of power, or performance of duty to which it refers.
James v. Dexter, 624.
STOCK. See CoRpouATION, I, 2, 11, 14-17, 29. TAX AND TAXATION, 2, 3.
STREET. See ACTION, 16, 17. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 19-21. HrtOWAs Ys,
ETC. MUNICIPAL COmtPORATIOx, 4. NEGLIGENCE, 9, 10.
SUBROGATION. See BANK, 3. MORTGAGE, 19.
1. Where land owner, to save his land, pays note secured by deed of trust
executed by former owner, upon which he is not legally liable, he is subrogated
to rights of holder as against maker. Allen v. Dermott, 216.
2. Rule that where one of two joint sureties holds collateral other is entitled
to share in it, does not apply where sureties are on separate bonds to secure
faithful discharge of principal's duty in different capacities, first as guardian
of insane ward, and then on ward's death, as administrator of her estate,
when collateral was not given as security for signing bond, but for signing as
surety certain bank-notes; although after it was claimed that principal was
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in default, sureties entered into written agreement to join in defence and share
equally in liability; and defendant realized more out of collaterals than he was
compelled to pay on said notes. Sewers v. Johnson, 751.
SUNDAY. See CommoN CAmRIE, 24, 25. HIGHWAYS, ETC., 5.
1. Contracts made on Sunday are not void on moral grounds, but because
of the penalty inflicted by statute. Swann v. Swann, 378, and note.
2. When by laws of state, large class of citizens may lawfully labor, etc.,
on Sunday, it is not, in legal sense, against public policy of such state, nor
shocking to moral sense of its people, for its courts to enforce contract made
on that day in another state, and valid by law of that state. Id.
3. Such contract will be enforced by courts of state, by laws of which it
would be void. Id.
4. The only admissible evidence of public policy of state are its constitu-
tion, laws and judicial decisions. Id.
5. Publication of ordinances with respect to street improvement, in news-
paper of general circulation, in accordance with statute, is valid, although
such newspaper is only published on Sunday. Hastings v. City, 352.
6. Contract of sale made on Sunday is void; but parties may, on subse-
quent week day, affirm or adopt its terms, as by payment and receipt of
purchase-money, and so become bound by them. Demand of payment on
week day would compel purchaser to adopt contract or insist on its invalidity.
McKinney v. Denby, 422.
SURETY. See GUARANTY, I. INTEREST, 1. MORTGAGE, 6. SUBROGATION,
2. USURY, 3.
1. Extension for definite time given on principal note, to which the note on
which sureties are liable is collateral, without their consent, discharges them.
Slagle v. Tbw, 624.
2. Of receiver in chancery concluded in suit at law on bend, by amount
found due on account taken in chancery, he having by due notice had oppor-
tunity to intervene in taking of such account. Ball v. Chancellor, 687.
3. On official bond of city clerk, who by city charter is also ex officio register
of licenses of city, liable for embezzlement by him of license fees. Van Valken-
bergh v. Mayor, 687.
4. Orators were sureties on note, and defendant payee. Principal attempted
to induce payee to accept his own note secured by mortgage on lot of land
owned by him in lieu of said note , and payee took mortgage into his possession,
and agreed to exchange, if on examination he should find title clear of encum-
brance. On being informed by town clerk that there was undiseharged mort-
gage on land, he refused to exchange, and returned mortgage to principal,
although surety requested him to hold it. It turned out afterwards that land was
clear. Held, that surety was not released. Adams v. Dutton, 751.
5. Wise needed money. Willard agreed to endorse his note to S. for $2700,
at four months, if Wise and wife would make to him their note for $3000, at
four months, secured by mortgage on wife's land ; he to hold and use said
mortgage to protect himself against loss and expense because of said endorse-
ment, Neither note was paid at maturity. Mortgage note was never extended,
but other note was renewed by agreement of parties to it for valuable consider-
ation. It remained unpaid, and Willard sued Wise and wife on mortgage note.
She set up extension of $2700 note as release of her property. Held, as Wil-
lard made no extehsion of mortgage note, he did not lose his right to enforce
mortgage. Wise v. Willard, 624.
TAX AND TAXATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 14, 15, 22, 23, 27,
28, 30, 33. CORPORATION, 20. ETECTMENT, 1. INJUNCTION, 3. MUazCI-
PAL CORPORATION, 1. 2, 15. NATIONAL BANx. POssESsION, 3.
1. Exemption from, granted to railroad, is personal privilege, incapable of
transfer, and does not pass to purchaser of road under mortgage. Lost in this
case by consolidation. Railroad Co. v. Berry, 422.
2. Under Vermont statute stock of non-resident stockholders of corporation
located in that state may be legally set in list of town in which corporation has
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its principal place of business; and corporation compelled by mandamus to pay
taxes assessed upon such stock. St. Albans v. Nat. Car Co., 624.
3. Statute authorizing such taxation, and allowing corporation to deduct
taxes thus paid from dividends, is constitutional. Id.
4. When charter is taken subject to future legislation, it may be modified not
only by special amendments, but also by general law. Id.
5. Only those individuals who can use city sewers should be specially taxed
for their construction or maintenance, and each in proportion to the benefits he
might individually receive. Gilmore v. Hertiq, 279.
6. In such cases, before special taxes can be made a fixed and permanent
charge upon property of such individuals, they must have notice, with oppor-
tunity to contest validity and fairness of such taxes ; but notice need not be
personally served or given before taxes are levied, nor need the proceeding be
judicial. rd.
TELEGRAPH. See CONTRACT, 2, 3.
1. Company liable for loss naturally following failure to transmit message
promptly and correctly, although it was in cipher or otherwise unintelligible.
Hart v. Telegraph Co., 320, and note. But see same case, 604.
2. Stipulation in telegraph blank that company shall not be liable for mis-
takes or delays in transmission or delivery, or for non-delivery of any unre-
peated message, whether happening by negligence of its servants or otherwise,
beyond amount received for sending same, is void for want of consideration.
.1d. Reversed, 604. See also Clement v. Telegraph Co., 328, and note.
3. Company cannot stipulate against liability for its own negligence; it is
exempt only for errors arising from causes beyond its control, and burden
of showing such exemption rests upon it. Bart v. Telegraph Co., 320, and
note. Reversed, 604.
4. Although telegraph blank is not used, if sender is aware of company's
conditions, he is bound thereby. Clement v. Telegraph Co., 328, and note.
5. In suit for damages for not delivering cable message within reasonable
time, copy message written by operator at point of destination and eventually
delivered, was admissible, without producing original, there being no claim that
message delivered differed from what was sent. Tel. Co. v. Fatman, 149.
6. Where ship broker, whose office was near that of telegraph company, had
sent other messages by cable through such company, and cipher message from
Liverpool was sent to him, there was enough to put company on notice that it
was a matter of important commercial business, and required reasonable and
ordinary despatch in delivery ; and party injured by failure to use such despatch
would not be limited to nominal damages. 1d.
7. Telegraph companies and. common carriers are not identical as regards
notice, or notice of value of despatch. Id.
8. If company receives cipher despatch, and undertakes to deliver it for
money paid, it is their duty to make such delivery within reasonable time ; where
message by cable was received at 10.24 and not delivered until 11.55 to office,
within five minutes walk, jury were warranted in finding unreasonable delay.
.d.
9. Where by reason of failure to deliver-message, ship broker, to whom mes-
sage was directed, lost contract, recovery of his commissions was proper.
Id.
TELEPHONE. See EVIDENCE, 18.
1. Is a common carrier and must furnish equal facilities to all ; may be com-
pelled sd to do by mandamus. State v. Tdephone Co., 262.
2. Having removed telephone because of a disputed bill which subscriber
refused to .pay, company cannot afterwards, on that account, refuse to admit
alleged delinquent as subscriber. Id.
3. A., Massachusettq corporation, and owner of patent on telephone, licensed
B., Missouri corporation, todo telephone business of St. Louis, upon condition
that B. should not connect with any telegraph company unless specially author-
ized by A. A. permitted B. to establish connection with Western Union Tele-
graph Co. Thereafter B. &. 0. Tel. Co. applied for mandamus to compel B.
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to permit telephonic communication between it and petitioner. A. was not
made a party. Held, that petitioner was entitled to relief asked. B. 6- 0. Co.
v. Bell Co., 573, and note.
TENANTS IN COMMON. See FuDs, STATUTE OF, 3, 4.
1. One tenant in common is not entitled to recover from his co-tenant con-
tribution in respect of repairs, although reasonable and necessary, done to the
common property. Proper remedy is by partition suit, in which court will take
into account all proper expenditure upon the property. Leigh v. Dickeson, 499,
and note.
2. Defendant was assignee of lease granted by plaintiff of undivided three-
fourths of certain premises to which plaintiff was entitled as tenant in common
with another. During lease the defendant purchased the one-fourth interest of
plaintiff's co-tenant. On expiration of lease defendant continued in occupation
of above three-fourths as tenant at sufferance to plaintiff. Held, that plaintiff
was entitled to recover in respect of use and occupation by defendant of undi-
vided three-fourths. Ad.
TORT. See ACTION, 16. ASSIGNMENT, 1. CONFLICT OF LAws, 1. CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAw, 32. CORFOnATION, 3, 21, 27. FORMER RECOVERY, 3.
HUSBAND AND WIFE, 28. PLEADING, 5, 6. SET-OFF, 2.
1. Any one owning or keeping an animal that he knows to be of ferocious
disposition, accustomed to attack or bite mankind, is bound to restrain such
animal at his peril. Twiggv. Ryland, 191, and note.
2. Allowing dog to be kept on his premises does not render owner liable for
injuries inflicted by dog away from premises, if such owner did not own or have
control of dog. Id.
3. To charge defendant be must be shown to have knowledge that the animal
is inclined to do the particular kind of mischief that has been done. Onus is on
plaintiff to prove knowledge of vicious propensities if animal be of domestic
nature, but otherwise if it is of a wild nature. ld.
4. Knowledge of servant or wife is not knowledge of owner or keeper, un-
less it be a servant who has general charge of the animal. Id.
5. J., who was injured by negligenceof defendant railroad company, assigned
his claim for damages to V., who executed agreement in-which, in considera-
tion of the assignment, he agreed to dispose of amount realized on claim as fol-
lows : To retain for himself $50 and his advances ; next, to pay the fees of
attorneys and agents employed to prosecute said claim, and to pay the balance
to J. Held, that the cause of action was assignable; that assignment and
agreement did not constitute barratry, cbamperty or maintenance; and that V.
was entitled to maintain the action in his own name. Vimont v. Railway Co.,
724, and note. See also Gates v. Railroad, 743.
6. In such action, even if it should appear that assignment was colorable and
fraudulent, assignor need not be made party to action. Id.
TRADE. See CONTRACT, 7.
TREATY. See INTERNATIONAL T AW.
TRESPASS. See ACTION, 1. DAMSAGEs, 8. EQUITY, 17. FIXTUREs, 2.
NEGLIGENCE, 38. TROvER, 5, 6.
I. Landlord cannot maintain, for injury to premises let done by tenant during
tenancy. His remedy is trespass on the case. Carroll v. Rigney, 804.
2. Entry upon premises by railway company and construction of railroad over
same, which is no injury to inheritance, under verbal license of life tenant, iq
not a trespass or unlawful entry. Remainderman cannot bring trespass or
ejectment. Railroad v. Goodwin, 280.
TRIAL. See EVIDENCE, 5, 6.
1. In action for personal injuries court may at trial direct plaintiff to submit
to personal examination by defendants' physicians. White v. Railroad Co., 150.
2. Jury are to find what words were used and their meaning, when oral bar-
gain is made. But court may inform jury what interpretations of language used
would be permissible. Connor v. Giles, 80.
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3. There must be more than a scintilla of evidence to take case to jury.
Conner v. Giles, 80.
4. Instruction authorizing jury, in determining issue, to infer what was the
fact from the evidence, " or from such personal knowledge as you may have in
relation to matters of this kind," is erroneous. Douglass v. Trask, 804.
5. Sealed verdict is not final but within control of jury until actually ren-
dered in court and recorded, and up to that time any juryman may withdraw
his consent. It should be presented by full jury in open court, so that jury may
be polied. Bishop v. Mugler, 280.
6. It is in discretion of court to limit time to be occupied by counsel in
addressing jury, and unless discretion is so exercised as practically to deny to
accused constitutional right to have assistance of counsel, it is not error. Sul-
livan v. State, 687.
TROVER. See BAILMENT, 4, 5. BANKRUPTCY. BILL Or LADING. SALE, 5.
1. Title to property does not pass when possession is obtained by fraud.
McCrillis v. Allen, 752.
2. Refusal to deliver primafacie evidence of conversion. Singer Co. v. King,
48, and note. See also, State v. Stevenson, 80.
3. Bailee or servant entitled to reasonable time to ascertain ownership ; but
his acting on order of principal and having no personal interest, will not further
protect him. Jd.
4. Bees are animalsferce naturm, and until reclaimed are owned ratione soli.
Rezroth v. Coon, 687.
5. Trespasser obtaining possession of animals ferce naturm, gains no title.
Id.
6. A., without B.'s permission, put upon tree on B.'s land empty box for
bees to hive in. Box remained there more than two years, when C. took box
down, took out swarm of bees and replaced box. A., after demand upon C.,
brought trover for value of bees, honey and honey-comb. Held, that action
could not be maintained. Id.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See ACTIxON, 10. AssIG.mENT, 10. CoRPoRA-
TION, 15. ExecUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 1. GUARANTY, 2. PowEn.
RAILROAD, 6, 7. WILL, 7, 8.
1. Orphans' Court has power to open decree settling intermediate account of
trustees, in which it appears that commissions were allowed in excess of sum
fixed by statute. Jackson v. Reynolds, 352.
2. When trust property is to be managed according to "best judgment "1 of
trustees, their discretion and 'not that of the court has been confided in ; court
can only interfere when it is not exercised in good faith. eazie v. Forsaith, 80.
3. S., wife of B., joined with him in deed to H. of land of B., in trust for
use of S. during life, and at any time to convey to such person as S. might
request in writing, with written consent of B. Afterwards B. made deed of
land to W., in which H. did not join, and in which B. was only grantor, and
S. was not described as party, but which was signed, sealed and acknowledged
by S. Held, that this deed did not convey legal title, and was not made in exe-
cution of power reserved to S. Batchelor v. Brereton, 150.
4. EMPLOYEES AS FIDUCIARIES OF THEIR EMPLOYERS, 425.
ULTRA VIRES. See CORPORATION, 3.
UNDUE INFLUENCE. See EQUITY, 21. WILL, 4.
UNITED STATES. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 25, 26. NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MENT.
1. Value of foreign coins, as ascertained by director of mint, and proclaimed
by secretary of treasury, on January Ist in each year, in accordance with Sect.
3564 Rev. Stat. U. S., is conclusive upon custom-house officers and importers.
Hadden v. Merritt, 688.
2. It is duty of land department, of which secretary of interior is head, to
determine whether land patented to settler is of class suhect to settlement under
pre-emption laws, and his judgment is not open to contest by mere intruder
without title, in action at law brought by patentee to recover possession. '.Bhr-
hardt v. Hogaboon, 550.
864 INDEX.
UNITED STATES.
3. Pre-emption laws of, imply a residence on the land both continuous and
personal; though settler may be excused for temporary absences, caused by
well-founded apprehensions of violence, by sickness, by presence of epidemic,
by judicial compulsion or by engagement in military or naval service, or other
like reason. Bofal v. LDill., 422.
4. Sheriff's sale of certain buildings and lot, under judgments on mechan-
ics' liens dating before but filed after seizure of buildings for forfeiture under
internal revenue laws of United States, which forfeiture proceedings were also
conducted to a sale, is void because based upon proceedings instituted while the
res was in exclusive custody and control of United States Court. Heidritter v.
Oilcloth Co., 150.
5. Semble, that the mechanics' lien creditors might have commenced their
actions, so far as that step was necessary to preserve their lien, without prejudice
to jurisdiction of United States Court. 7d.
UNITED STATES COURTS. See EnitoRs AND APPEALS, 3, 4. MUNICIPAL
ConuoRATIoN, 14. PLRADING, 4. RESI ovAL ol CAuSES.
1. State statute forbidding physicians to disclose professional communications,
obligatory on. Ins. Co. v. Trust Co., 55.
2. Sect. 721 of Rev. Stat., declaring that laws of several states, except
where constitution, &c., of United States otherwise require, "shall be regarded
as rules of decision, in trials at common law in the courts of the United States,"
relates to nature and principles of evidence, and also to competency of wit-
nesses. Id.
3. A United States court having obtained jurisdiction on ground of citizen-
ship 6f creditor's bill, will not lose it because of citizenship of others added as
plaintiffs. Other creditors coming in under such bill can either become co-
complainants, or appear before master under decree ordering reference to prove
claims. Stewart v. )unham, 550.
4. Bill was filed by H. B. "in his capacity as president of the New Orleans
National Bank," against citizen tof Louisiana, and defendant, on appeal,
assigned as error want of proper citizenship to give United States Circuit
Court jurisdiction. Upon inspection of whole record it appeared that suit had
been treated as suit of bank. Held, that defendant on final hearing, in order
to defeat jurisdiction, could not assert, for first time, that B. and not the bank,
was complainant. Fortier v. Bank, 150.
USURY.
1. In case of three separate loans the note given at time of second and third
loans embraced the amount previously loaned and usurious interest. Held, in
action to foreclose mortgqge given to secure payment of last note, all illegal
interest should be deducted. Beals v. Lewis, 488.
2. Party not injuriously affected by usurious transaction cannot set it up.
So if party sells land subject to mortgage given to secure debt, with usury
reserved, and purchaser assumes payment of debt as part of purchase-money,
such purchaser or those claiming under him, cannot interpose defence of usury
to bill to foreclose mortgage. Stiger v. Bent, 280.
3. Where principal debtor conveyed land to surety to indemnify him against
loss, and, after debt has been reduced to judgment and levy made, surety paid
off execution, and thereupon brought ejectment against principal to recover
land, it was no defence to allege usury in contract between principal and
original creditors. Maples v. Cox, 352.
4. The P. L. Co. held three mortgages made by D. of different dates. Usu-
rious interest was paid on two elder mortgages, and aggregate amount of pay-
ments exceeded amount of principal with legal interest thereon. More than
three years after last payments thereon., D. filed bill for redemption of all three
mortgages, and for an account, and asked that amount overpaid on first two
mortgages should be applied in reduction of third. On limitations pleaded in
bar of right to account, held, that it being conceded that there had been appli-
cation of payments already made by agreement of parties to first two mortgages,
those payments could not by mere operation of law be afterwards transferred
to subsequent debt created by last mortgage. Dickey v. Land Co., 752.
5. Rule of application of payments stated. Id.
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VENDOR AND VENDEE. See MORTGAGE, 21. SALE, 9.
VERDICT. See DAMAGES, 2. TRIAL, 5.
VESSEL.
Joint owner of, cannot maintain action against co-owner for conversion thereof,
except in case of total destruction, or something equivalent thereto, through fault
of such co-owner. That co-owner has negligently damaged vessel, or run it
into debt and created liens upon it beyond its value, is not sufficient. Alder-
son v. Schulze, 752.
WAGES. See ASSIGNMENT, 2.
WAIVER. See INSURANCE, 6, 25. MORTGAGE, 4. POSSESSION, 1. REuovAL
OF CAUSES, 7.
WAREHOUSEMAN. See CommoN CARRIER, 5. SALE, 3, 4.
WARRANTY. See CORPORATION, 29. INsuRANcE, 26.
WASTE. See INJUNCTION, 2.
WATERS AND WATER-COURSES. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 14.
1. Rural landowner has no right to put up such artificial barriers as will flood
his neighbor's land with surface water, that would otherwise eicape over his
own, for mere purpose of reclaiming bed of pond that had always been on his
own premises. Boy/d v. Conklin, 305, and note.
2. There is no property in underground water percolating in unknown chan-
nels, but every landowner has unlimited right of appropriating such water in its
natural state by lawful, even if artificial means, and can maintain action against
and enjoin anyone interfering with that right by contaminating the water.
Ballard v. Tomlinson, 634, and note.
3. Mill-owner upon floatable river need not provide public way for passage
of logs over his dam, better than would be afforded by natural condition of.
river unobstructed by his mills. Pearson v. Rolfe, 151.
4. Whenever river with mills upon it is floatable, and mill-owner and those
who want to float logs are desirous of using water at same time, all parties are
entitled to reasonable use of common boom ; right of passage is superior but
not excessive or exclusive: what is reasonable use is question of fact depending
upon all the circumstances. .d.
WAY.
1. Existence of public way may be established by evidence of uninterrupted
user by public for twenty years. Thomas v. Ford, 805.
2. At common law, however, principle of presumptive dedication, or quasi
prescription, does not apply to give rise to right in general public to use land
of individual on navigable river, as public landing, and place of deposit of wood
and other articles for indefinite time. Id.
3. Owner has full dominion and control over land over which is ordinary
highway, subject to easement in public. Id.
4. Railway company which has entered upon land under license from owner,
and constructed its road, cannot plead such license as defence to action of tres-
pass quare clatwumfregit, for running its trains over said land, brought by owner
thereof. A right of way can be acquired in Maryland, only by deed duly exe-
cuted and recorded, as provided by statute. Railroad v. Alire, 805.
5. Where railway company has built road on faith of owner's license, which
he subsequently revokes, court of equity will restrain him from interfering with
railway company in use and enjoyment of right of way pending proceedings to
have same condemned. Id.
WILL. See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 9. EUS1.AND AND WIFE, 10. INSURANCE,
18.
1. Under statute requiring that will shall be attested and subscribed in pre-
sence of testator, witness must actually sign in testator's presence. Pawtucket
v. Ballou, 805.
2. Where devise is made to class of persons not named, as "heirs at law,'
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the estate will be divided among the heirs as in case of intdstacy. Kelley v.
Vigas, 551.
3. Statute which provides for ante mortem probate of will is inoperative and
void. Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit Judqe, 790, and note.
4. Proceeding authorized by such statute by which questions as to competency,
undue influence, &c., can be determined in advance of testator's death, is not
within any xecognised judicial power, and courts cannot be called upon to
enforce it. Id.
5. Under statute providing that child unintentionally omitted from will
should take pro rata share, child is not entitled if omission is intentional,
although testator would not have entertained such intention but for mistake as
to matters outside of will. Hurley v. O'Sullivan, 80.
6. It is not against public policy or illegal to make devise or bequest
dependent upon condition that legatee should withdraw from priesthood or
membership of any order or society connected with Roman Catholic Church,
or refrain from forming any such connection. Barnum v. Mayor, 352.
7. City of Baltimore has power to accept and hold in trust, any property for
educational and charitable purposes. .d.
8. Where property is held by municipal corporation in trust, or where the
trust reposed in the corporation is for a charity, within scope of its duties, court
of chancery will compel execution of trust. This jurisdiction is not founded
upon statute of 43 Eliz., ch. 4, but is part of original, inherent jurisdiction
of Conrt of Chancery over trusts. Id.
9. Testator directed his residuary estate to be "equally divided among my
brothers and sisters and their heirs." When will was made and at testator's
death, as he knew there were living three brothers, one sister, and children and
grandchildren of two deceased sisters. Held, that heirs of deceased sisters
took by representation, equally with surviving brothers and sister. Huntress v.
Place, 280.
10. Residuary estate was willed to "my sons, S., T., B., H., J. and C. to
have and to hold the same * * * to them the said S., T., B., H., J. and C.,
their heirs and assigns forever." Held, devisees being individually named and
nothing in will or in testator's circumstances indicating different intent, that
devisees took as individuals and not as a class; and one of the son's dying
without issue before testator, that his share lapsed, and at testator's death
descended to his heirs as intestate estate. Churoi v. Church, 805.
11. When testator devises his real estate to his heirs, and gives legacies to
persons not his heirs, making them charge on land, it is fraud for heirs, by
agreement exclusively between themselves, to procure county court to disallow
will-case being there on appeal from decree of probate court establishing will
-and then to divide estate solely among themselves, ignoring rights of lega-
tees, who were meinors and unrepresented. Court of Chancery, land still bing
in possession of heir, has power to char-ge legacy upon it, on ground of fraud.
Wetherbee v. Chase, 688.
WITNESS. See CIIINAL LAw, 2, 7. EVIDENCE, 13, 16, 17. ExriET.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTIoN, 3, 4. SLANDER AND LIBEL, 3.
1. Defendant in proceedings, civil or criminal, who testifies in his own be-
half, may be impeached like any other witness, by showing his previous convic-
tion of felony. State v. M11cGuire, 682.
2. Evidence of character and present reputation of, for truth, admissible to
rebut evidence of conviction for crime ; but rot evidence of innocence of crime,
and in explanation of conviction. Gertz v. Railroad Co., 80.
3. Prochein ami is not party to suit within meaning of Maryland Evidence
Act. Trahern v. Colburn, 550.
4. In action against executor by married woman suing by her husband as
next friend, he is competent witness in her behalf. And that he is directly
interested in fixing liability upon estate of deceased, because of his liability over
to his wife in respect of transactions as her agent, does not exclude him. Id.
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